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THE POWER OF DIRECTORS TO TERMINATE 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION: THE 
DEATH OF THE DERIVATIVE SUIT? 
George W. Dent, Jr. * 
Shareholders' derivative suits 1 have long played2 a crucial role in 
assuring a modicum of integrity and competence in the management of 
corporations.3 Nonetheless, real or imagined abuses4 of the derivative 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
B.A., Columbia College, 1969; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1973. Professor Dent was the Orison 
S. Marden Fellow at New York University School of Law while this article was being written and 
wishes to express his gratitude for the financial assistance of the Orison S. Marden Fund. Grati-
tude is also expressed for the research assistance of Susan C. Zuckerman and Jay Zitter. 
I A shareholders' derivative suit is a suit brought by shareholders on behalf of and for the 
direct benefit of the corporation to redress harm to the corporation. The derivative suit permits a 
shareholder to assert a corporate claim "[w]hen the corporate cause of action is for some reason 
not asserted by the corporation itself .... " H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES§ 360, at 756 (2d ed. 1970). The derivative suit has also 
been called a shareholder's or stockholder's suit, and a minority shareholder's suit. See id; W.. 
CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 868-69 (4th ed. 1969); Prunty, The Sharehold-
ers' Derivative Suit: Notes On Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980, 980 (1957); Stickells, Deriva-
tive Suits-The Requirement of Demand Upon the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. REV. 433, 433 (1953). 
The derivative suit is to be distinguished from the representative suit, in which the shareholder 
complains of an injury not to the corporation but directly to himself and other shareholders. 
Haudek, The Selllement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part /, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 768 
(1968). 
2 The shareholders' derivative suit is often said to have originated with Foss v. Harbottle, 67 
Eng. Rep. !89 (Ch. 1843). The right of minority shareholders to secure relief for managerial 
excesses, however, was recognized in America as early as Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 
(N.Y. 1832), and in England as early as Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1828), 39 
Eng. Rep. 58 (Ch. 1829). See generally Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd 
on other grounds, 396 U.S. 53! (1970). The derivative suit has been authorized in nearly all states. 
Eg., DEL CoDE ANN. til. 8, § 327 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 626 (McKinney 1963); Berger, 
"Disregarding the Corporate Entity".for Stockholders' Bentjit, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 816 n.60 
(1955); Prunty, supra note I, at 980. 
3 Dean Rostow has called the derivative suit "the most important procedure the law has yet 
developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is 
Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoRPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason 
ed. 1959). Justice Jackson called it "the chief regulator of corporate management." Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 
U.S. 363, 371 (1966); Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); N. LATTIN, THE 
LAW oF CoRPORATIONS § 115, at 457 (2d ed. 1971) ("The derivative suit is the minority share-
holders' one effective remedy against management's abuse of its trusteeship."). A wide variety of 
corporate injuries has been redressed by derivative suits. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative 
Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-82 (1967); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in 
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suit process have prompted courts and state legislatures to erect many 
obstacles to the bringing of these suits.5 Many of these obstacles seem 
designed more to thwart all derivative suits, including those that are 
meritorious, than to prevent alleged abuses.6 
One such obstacle is the rule adopted in many cases that the board 
of directors' refusal to sue or its active opposition to the derivative suit? 
will, under some circumstances, warrant dismissal of the suit. Al-
though this rule is by no means new, 8 the courts have begun to use it 
with increasing frequency. The rule generally has been held not to ap-
ply if a majority of the board is implicated in the alleged wrong. 9 Sev-
eral recent cases, however, have held that if a duly appointed 
committee of directors (sometimes caiied a "special litigation commit-
tee"10) not implicated in the alleged wrong decides not to sue, that deci-
Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. !68, 194 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO 
Comment]. 
· 4 For a discussion of the alleged abuses, see text accompanying notes 203-22 infra. 
5 These obstacles include the following requirements: ownership of stock at the commence-
ment and during the pendency of the suit; ownership of stock at the time of the alleged wrong, 
known as the contemporaneous ownership requirement; allegation with particularity of the facts 
constituting the corporate cause of action, often interpreted to require the plaintiff in effect to 
plead evidence; demands on the board and the shareholders to take action with respect to the 
alleged wrong or a showing that such demands would be futile; fair representation of the share-
holders by the plaintiff; provision by plaintiff of security for expenses, including attorneys' fees, of 
the corporation; indemnification of corporate personnel for litigation expenses; bringing of suit 
within the period of a short statute of limitations for certain actions against directors, officers, and 
shareholders; and reimbursement of defendants' expenses. See generally H. HENN, supra note I, 
§§ 359, 361-367, 372, 378; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, §§ 105-106. 
6 A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE§ 252, at 399-400 (1976); Dykstra, supra note 
3, at 75; Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. I, 2-3 
(1947). 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, derivative suits have managed to survive and perhaps even 
to thrive. See Dykstra, supra note 3, at 74-75 (finding a 50% increase in derivative suits noted in 
West's Seventh Decennial Digest for 1956-1966 over the number reported for the prior decade). 
Cf Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 65-66 (1968) (concluding that security-for-expenses statutes are not "a sig-
nificant deterrent to derivative litigation"). 
7 The courts have not distinguished between the board's active opposition to a derivative suit 
and its mere refusal to sue. There are, however, factors that would warrant the board's refusal to 
sue but not dismissal of a derivative suit. See text accompanying notes 112 & 162-63 infra. 
8 The rule is at least as old as Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). 
9 See note 31 infra. 
10 Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control 
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Cramer v. General 
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoffv. General Tel. & Elec. 
Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 11, 
·1980); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at 11, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Auerbach v. 
Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J., 
Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 24, 1980) ("Independent Investigation Committee"); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) ("Special Review Committee"); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. 
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sion will block even a derivative suit against a majority of the 
directors. II 
A derivative suit generally may be brought only when the board 
has refused to sue.I2 Thus, a rule permitting the board to terminate 
derivative suits which, by hypothesis, it refuses to bring itself could 
mean the death of the derivative suit. A decision by the board or some 
of its members to terminate litigation against directors entails potential 
conflicts of interest too serious to ignore. If the board is disabled com-
pletely from terminating derivative suits, however, the corporation 
could be saddled with expensive, frivolous, vexatious litigation. This 
article will analyze the problems raised by the board's attempt to termi- , 
nate shareholder suits and will advance proposals to deal with those 
problems. · 
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Modem corporation laws generally provide that the business of a 
corporation shall be managed by or under the supervision of a board of 
directors.I3 The power to manage corporate business usually includes 
the power to determine whether the corporation shall sue for redress of 
a wrong it is alleged to have suffered.I4 When the alleged wrongdoers 
are not affiliated with the corporation, the board can be expected to 
weigh dispassionately the benefits and detriments of litigation. Where 
the directors themselves are alleged to have wronged the corporation, 
however, a decision by the directors whether to sue themselves obvi-
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Special Review Committee"); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 
F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Special Committee on Litigation"); Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 
4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) ("Independent Investigation Committee"). 
IT See text accompanying notes 51-69 infra. 
i I2iSee H. HENN, supra note I, § 364. Until recently, it could safely be said that a derivative 
action also could be brought where the board obviously would refuse to sue, as where the alleged 
wrongdoers constituted a majority of the board or otherwise dominated the corporation. See 
notes 17-20 and accompanying text i'!fra. If, however, as some courts have recently held, a com-
mittee of nonimplicated directors may decide whether such suits should be brought, see text ac-
companying notes 51-69 i'!fra, plaintiff may not be able to proceed on the theory that in such cases 
the board obviously would refuse to sue. See Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 14 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (complaint dismissed for plaintiff's failure to make demand on board 
where board had established a litigation committee). 
I3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 
Supp. 1979-1980). See generally N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 69; Note, Economic Institutions and 
Values: Fiduciary Responsibility of Corporate Officers and Directors, 36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 343, 
357 (1961). 
I4 See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917); 
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167, 
169 (D. Conn. 1950); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 46, 91 N.E. 683, 694 (1910); Barr v. 
Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378,329 N.E.2d 180, 185-86, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 504-05 (1975); Koral v. 
' Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 217, II N.E.2d 883, 884-85 (1937); Passmore v. Allentown & Reading 
Traction Co., 267 Pa. 356, 358-59, 110 A. 240, 241 (1920); 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 5822 (rev. perm. ed. 1970). 
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ously will not be dispassionate. 15 It is largely to handle such situations 
that the law permits shareholder suits on behalf of a corporation. 16 
Because the power to manage the corporation resides initially with 
the· board, before commencing a derivative action a shareholder gener-
ally must make a demand on the board that it bring a suit seeking 
redre~s for the alleged wrong.n Where, however, the alleged wrongdo-
ers include a majority of the board18 or otherwise control the corpora-
tion or the board, as through ownership of a majority of the voting 
stock, 19 the demand is generally excused on the theory that the demand 
would be futile because those who control the corporation cannot be 
expected to sue themselves.20 
15 Dispassion also may be absent where the alleged wrongdoers are officers or major share-
holders who are not also directors. See notes 147 & 153 and accompanying text itifra. 
16 Although state statutes do not limit derivative suits to actions against officers and directors, 
most derivative suits take this form. A. CoNARD, supra note 6, § 252, at 401. See Hornstein, The 
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797 (1939) (finding that in 
nearly all of the 54 successful derivative suits surveyed, "the defendants included one or more 
directors of the corporation"); Rostow, supra note 3, at 48~49. 
17 Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882); DiFani v. Riverside County Oil 
Co., 201 Cal. 210, 215,256 P. 210,213 (1927); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 277, 283, 
125 A. 411, 414 (1924); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 19, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912) . 
. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5963; H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365. See generally Note, 
Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 74(! 
(1960) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD Note]; CHICAGO Comment, note 3 supra. Rule 23.1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to "allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors .. _ and the reasons 
for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1. Many state 
statutes and court rules are modeled on federal rule 23.1. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 800(b)(2) 
(West 1977); N.J. C1v. PRAC. R. 4:32-5; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 626(c) (McKinney 1963). 
The purpose of requiring a demand on the board has been stated variously as giving the 
directors the opportunity to take over the suit, Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 
1975); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 
1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 364, at 770; giving the 
board the opportunity to settle the dispute without litigation, thus promoting judicial economy, 
Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America, 259 Minn. 257, 262, 107 N.W.2d 226, 233 
( 1961); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 505 (1975); 
and preventing interference in corporate affairs until intracorporate remedies have been ex-
hausted, CHICAGO Comment, supra note 3, at 171. See also HARVARD Note, supra, at 748-49. 
18 Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964) 
(applying Virginia Law); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 316, 144 So. 674, 678 
(1932); Robb v. Eastgate Hotel Inc., 347 Ill. App. 261, 279, 106 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1952); Eston v. 
Argus, 328 Mich. 554, 556, 44 N.W.2d 154, 155 (1950); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 192, 30 
S.W.2d 976, 979 (1930); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 
497, 505 (1975); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 105, at 417. 
19 Craftsman Fin. & Mort. Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Grant v. 
Grosnell, 266 S.C. 372,223 S.E.2d 413 (1976); Akin v. Mackie, 203 Tenn. 113, 121,310 S.W.2d 
164, 168 (1958); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 365. 
20 See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5965 and authorities cited therein; H. HENN, supra 
note I,§ 365; HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 753. Trial courts are afforded considerable discre-
tion in determining whether the demand should be excused. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, 
§ 5965, at 370 & 374 n.2. Federal courts generally have been liberal in excusing demand under 
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Whether the derivative suit may proceed in the face of the board's 
opposition to it is unclear. Most courts have held that the board's op-
position will warrant termination of a derivative suit in some circum-
stances. These courts disagree, however, as to what the applicable 
standard is and how that standard should be applied. 
The positions taken by the courts in the many cases dealing with 
the effect of a refusal to sue21 fall into a relatively few categories. A few 
courts have simply stated, usually in dictum, that the shareholder is 
automatically entitled to sue derivatively if the board refuses to sue. 22 
Several courts have held that the board's refusal to sue on a particular 
kind of claim (or, in a few cases, on any valid claim) constitutes a 
breach of trust; therefore, if a shareholder's complaint states such a 
claim, the board's refusal to sue will not bar the derivative suit.23 Most 
courts have held, however, that the board's refusal to sue falls within 
the business judgment rule24 and blocks the derivative suit unless the 
plaintiff shows some defect in the board's action. 25 
FED. R. C!v. P. 23.1. De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (lOth Cir. 1970). But 
see Seigal v. Merrick, No. 2475, slip. op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (complaint dismissed for 
plaintiff's failure to make demand on board where board has established a litigation committee). 
21 Although this article will mention over 50 such cases, it is surprising that so many derivative 
suits have proceeded without discussing this issue. Since a detivative suit generally may proceed 
only if the corporation has declined to sue after receiving a shareholder's demand that it sue, see 
notes 12 & 17 supra, one would imagine that nearly every derivative suit would follow the board's 
refusal to sue and would thus face the question of the effect of that refusal. In cases not raising 
this question, perhaps defense attorneys either viewed a defense based on the refusal as hopeless 
because a majority of the board was implicated in the alleged wrong or simply overlooked the 
defense. 
22 See Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1048 (1974); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1927); Maldonado v. Flynn, 
No. 4800, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. Sup. Ct. 
1927); Anderson v. Johnson, 45 R.I. 17, 23, 119 A. 642, 644 (1923); Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. 
Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 151, 131 P. 485, 488 (1913) (dictum). 
23 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856) (refusa! to attack a tax that directors 
conceded was unconstitutional); Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 119 N.W. 951 (1909) (refusal to 
sue to redress alleged fraud); Sullivan v. Mountain, 117 Mont. 224, 160 P.2d 477 (1945) (refusal to 
sue to recover illegal commission); Siegman v. Kissel, 71 N.J. Eq. 123, 62 A. 941 ( 1906), ajf'd sub 
nom. Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65 A. 910 (1907) (refusal to sue on wrong-
ful payment of dividend); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905) (refusal to 
sue on an allegedly valid claim); Epstein v. Schenk, 178 Misc. 607, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 
1939) (refusal to sue on any clear cause of action). q. HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 762 
(derivative suit should always be permitted if alleged wrong is not ratifiable). 
24 Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Issner v. Aldrich, 
254 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Del. 1966). See also note 65 and accompanying text i'!fra. 
25 Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 F. 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1912); Klotz v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burke v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 324 F. Supp. 
1125, 1129 (S.D. Ala. 1971), affd, 465 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1972); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. 
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 112-13, 93 N.E.2d 241, 248-49 (1950) (dic-
tum); .Brooks v. Brooks Pontiac, Inc., 143 Mont. 256, 260, 389 P.2d 185, 188 (1964); Noble v. 
Farmers Union Trading Co., 123 Mont. 518, 527, 216 P.2d 925, 935 (1950); Chambers v. Cham-
bers & McKee Glass Co., 185 Pa. 105, 109-10, 39 A. 822, 823-24 (1898). q. Miller v. American 
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The business judgment rule provides that directors shall not be 
liable for harm to the corporation resulting from their decisions if those 
decisions lie within the powers of the corporation and the authority of 
management and were reasonably made in good faith and with loyalty 
and due care;26 that is, directors are not to be held liable if they have 
fulfilled all their duties to the corporation. 27 In many cases, the courts 
have overlooked or ignored these requirements of the rule.28 Techni-
TeL & TeL Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (derivative suit may proceed where directors' 
refusal to sue violates a statute). 
26 See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (applying 
Michigan law); Pollitz v:Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912); 3A W. 
fLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1039, at 38; H. HENN, supra note I,§ 242; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, 
§ 78, at 272-73; Note, The Continuing Viability o.f the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial 
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 562-63 (1967); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule: A 
Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. !51 (1962). 
It is widely agreed that the business judgment rule requires due care, which generally imports 
a negligence standard. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1891); Miller v. American TeL 
& Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 72-74 (1880); Casey v. 
Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1039, at 38, 42 
n.9, § 1040, at 44, 45 n.l; H. HENN, supra note I, § 234, § 242, at 483; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, 
§ 78, at 274. Thus, the rule is consistent with statutes adopted in many states requiring directors to 
act with due care or ordinary prudence. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 
1979-1980). Some courts have held the standard of care to be one of gross negligence. 3A W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at 12 N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 78, at 274 & nn.l2 & 13. This 
test has been criticized and generally is not followed, 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at 
12, § 1040, at 44, 45 n.5; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 78, at 274, although courts have tended to 
define negligence narrowly. See note 37 i'!fra. 
The duty of due care requires not only good faith and a modicum of effort, but also proper 
skill and a reasonable basis for any judgment reached. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880); 3A W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1040, at 44, 45 nn.l & 2, § 1055, at 65 & n.2, § 1061, at 74; H. HENN, 
supra note I, § 242, at 482-83. Thus, "a director is chargeable with the knowledge actually pos-
sessed or which he might have possessed had he diligently discharged his functions." 3A W. 
fLETCHER, supra note 14, § 1029, at 12. Accord, id. § 1059, at 68, 69 n.l; H. HENN, supra note I, 
§ 234, at 455. 
27 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 242, at 483 ("Business judgment thus, by definition, presup-
poses an honest, unbiased judgment (compliance with fiduciary duty) reasonably exercised (due 
care), and compliance with other applicable requirements."). The rule does not bar inquiry into 
the directors' independence. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,631,393 N.E.2d 994, 1001,419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979). It is often stated that the rule frees directors from liability for errors of 
judgment, but the rule is unnecessary for that purpose because none of the directors' duties im-
poses such liability in any case. 
28 Many courts have dismissed derivative suits on the ground that the directors' refusal to sue 
was sacrosanct under the business judgment rule, even though the courts made no real inquiry as 
to whether the decision not to sue (and to oppose the derivative suit) was reached with due care 
(including a reasonable investigation) and skill, without any conflict of interest, and had a reason-
able b.asis. For example, the business judgment rule does not warrant dismissal of a complaint on 
a motion for summary judgment-unless plaintiff admits that the directors have satisfied the 
rule-because such a motion raises issues of fact regarding the directors' due care and loyalty. 
Nonetheless, many suits have been dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of the business 
judgment rule. See, e.g., Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
373 U.S. 915 (1963); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 ·N.Y.S.2d 920 
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cally, the rule would seem irrelevant as to the effect that a refusal to sue 
has on a derivative suit, since the derivative suit seeks neither to hold 
the directors liable for their refusal to sue nor to compel the corpora-
tion to sue.29 Nevertheless, the derivative suit is usually barred unless 
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the board's decision not to sue was 
ultra vires, or made fraudulently, in bad faith, in breach of trust, or the 
like.30 The board's involvement or collusion in the alleged wrongdo-
ing31 and inexcusable neglect32 have also been cited as grounds for al-
lowing the derivative suit to proceed despite a refusal to sue. A few 
(1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 
(Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Bennett v. Instrument Systems Corp., 66 A.D.2d 
708, 411 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978). 
29 q. Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800, slip. op. at 15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) (business judg-
ment rule does not apply to suit alleging self-dealing). The courts, however, often have not so 
interpreted the rule. See note 24 and accompanying text supra, and notes 59, 62, & 65 and accom-
panying text infra. 
30 See cases cited in note 25 supra. 
31 United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917); Corbus v. 
Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 461 (1903); Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 
450, 460 (1882); Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 9J2, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1962), cerl. 
denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963). See Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969) (involve-
ment of trustee rendered his refusal ineffective to block shareholder suit); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. 
Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966) (applying Virginia law); Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 
N.E.2d 442, 446, 449 (Ohio C. P. 1954); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 219, II N.E.2d 883, 
886 (1937) (shareholder is not barred from bringing suit when receiver who refused to sue partici-
pated in the wrongdoing). Cf. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427 
(1952) (dictum) (interest of majority of board "might be argued" to preclude them from terminat-
ing derivative suit); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 106-07, 250 S.E.2d 279, 298 (1978) 
(board's early opposition to derivative suit justified finding that it had not exercised independent 
judgment). 
The board's refusal to sue generally will not thwart the suit where a majority of directors is 
involved in the alleged wrong. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,460 (1882) (plaintiff 
may sue if he alleges that a majority of the directors "are aciing for their own interest"); Galef v. 
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5905 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (court may dismiss where a disin-
terested board majority opposes the suit); Ash v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 
(3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966) (plaintiff must allege "that the directors of the 
corporation are personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing"); Swanson v. Traer, 
249 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1957) (suit dismissed where a majority of directors was "admittedly 
honest" and "not ... involved in the alleged wrongs"); Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank 
(N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judgment denied where the board "par-
ticipated in and allegedly approved the transaction under attack"); Issuer v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 
696, 699, 701 (D. Del. 1966) (suit dismissed where majority of directors is not "guilty of any 
particular wrongdoing ... or improper self interest" in the challenged transactions). 
32 Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 291-92, 131 S.W. 340, 345 (1910); Syracuse 
Television, Inc. v. Channel9 Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 194-95,273 N.Y.S.2d 16,25-26 (Sup. 
Ct. 1966) (board ignored plaintiff's demand), rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 638, 280 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1967); 
J.C.F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 181 Misc. 283, 286-87, 46 N.Y.S.2d 605, 609-
10 (Sup. Ct. 1943), ajf'd mem., 267 A.D. 863, 47 N. Y.S.2d 303 (1944); Koch v. Estes, 146 Misc. 249, 
253-54, 262 N.Y.S. 23, 27-28 (Sup. Ct.), ajf'd mem., 240 A.D. 829, 266 N.Y.S. 1008 (1933), ajfd 
mem., 264 N.Y. 480, 191 N.E. 525 (1934). 
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courts have added that the court may inquire into the reasonableness of 
the board's refusal to sue.33 
Moreover, the defects in board action cited by courts as sufficient 
to permit a derivative suit are largely dicta, bearing little relation to the 
facts.34 This increases the difficulty of determining where the courts 
stand on many questions. For example, although only a few courts 
have stated that a derivative suit may proceed if the board's refusal to 
sue is alleged to be unreasonable, no court has expressly stated that 
such an allegation is insufficient to permit the plaintiff to proceed. 
Usually, the court gives only a general list of defects that does not in-
clude the unreasonableness of the directors' decision.35 Moreover, 
since plaintiffs rarely allege that the board's refusal was unreasonable, 
the courts have seldom ruled on such an allegation. Thus, the applica-
bility and scope of the business judgment rule in the context of refusals 
to sue remain unsettled. 
The duties of loyalty and due care, which the business judgment 
rule incorporates, are themselves of uncertain scope. Although due 
care is usally said, often in statutes, to import a "prudent man" or neg-
ligence standard, 36 it is clear that in practice courts rarely hold directors 
liable for negligence alone.37 Where a conflict of interest is involved, 
however, courts scrutinize directors' acts much more carefully. This 
has led some to state that the business judgment rule does not apply to 
33 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1129 (1979) (dictum); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,762 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 US. 960 (1974) (court must 
consider whether refusal by receiver was "justified"). See Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 102, Ill 
So. 2d I, 5 (1959); Lazar v. Merchants' Nat'! Properties, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 235, 237, 256 N.Y.S.2d 
514, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1964), ajf'd mem., 22 A.D.2d 253, 256 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1965); Markewich v. 
Newberg, 27 Misc. 2d 1040, 1041, 210 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (Sup. Ct. 1960). q: United Copper Sec. 
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,264 (1917) (Court stated that there was no "allega-
tion that [the directors'] action in refusing to bring ... suit [was] unwise."); Bernstein v. Medi-
obanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(factors "less compelling than bad faith" may suffice). But see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 
619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
34 See, e.g., Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,460 (1882), where the Court cited ultra 
vires acts, fraud, illegal and oppressive acts or self-dealing by the majority as acts sufficient to 
permit a derivative suit to proceed. Since the complaint in Hawes alleged no such acts, however, 
the list is of limited value. 
35 See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra. 36 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) ("that degree of care 
which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances"). 
See generally H. HENN, supra note I, § 234. See also note 26 supra. 37 See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Jndemn!fication of Corporate 
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which directors of 
industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by 
self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in ·a very large haystack."). 
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acts entailing conflicts of interest.38 The statement is unnecessary, 
though, because the rule requires compliance with the duty of loyalty 
and thus, if applicable, requires the same careful scrutiny that courts 
otherwise give to conflicts of interst. 
A further problem is that the courts have rarely spelled out what 
facts plaintiff must allege to make a sufficient pleading of the directors' 
bad faith, lack of independence, or involvement or collusion in the 
wrong,39 nor have the courts indicated to what extent plaintiffs are enti-
tled to discovery and a trial to unearth and prove the necessary facts. 
No court has expressly denied that allegations of bias, collusion, bad 
faith, or unreasonableness raise questions of fact. Yet, while a few 
courts have stated that these allegations can be resolved only after dis-
covery40 or only at trial,41 others have dismissed complaints containing 
such allegations for want of sufficient particularity.42 
In short, one can rarely predict what standard a court will apply 
and how it will apply that standard to the question whether the board's 
opposition warrants dismissal of a derivative suit against corporate in-
siders. One point is settled, however: even where a plaintiffs claims 
are based on federal law, the effect of the board's refusal to sue gener-
ally will be determined by reference to state law. In Burks v. Lasker,4 3 
the Supreme Court held that the Investment Company Act of 194044 
and the Investment Advisers Act of 194045 "did not require that States, 
38 Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Gurde for Judicial Re-
straint, 35 GEO. WASH. L REV. 562, 564 (1967). 
39 It is not clear what facts plaintiff must allege to plead either acquiescence by the board in 
the wrong or domination of the board by the wrongdoers. Apparently, a bare claim of acquies-
cence will not suffice. See Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952). Com-
pare Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 220, 11 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1937) (domination of corporate 
receiver sufficiently pleaded by allegations that he was a clerk in the office of the attorneys of the 
alleged wrongdoers) with Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 701 (D. Del. 1966) (domination of 
board not sufficiently pleaded by allegations that alleged wrongdoer, itself a corporation, was the 
corporation's largest shareholder, with more than 12% of its stock, and had three of its employees 
on the corporation's 17-member board). See also Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 
N.E.2d 180, 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 506 (1975) (allegations of acquiescence held sufficient where 
"based on formal action of the board in which the individual directors were participants"). See 
also notes 226-27 infra. 
40 Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario-Societa per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 
598 (S.D.N. Y. 1974) (permitting discovery only of matters "relating to the business judgment de-
fense"). 
41 Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dic-
tum) (summary judgment granted on other grounds). See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 150-52 
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 759, 144 
P. 2d 725, 731 (1944) 
42 Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 702 (D. Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 
166, 176, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952). 
43 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979). 
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-52 (1976). 
45 Jd. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21. 
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or federal courts, absolutely forbid director termination of all nonfrivo-
lous [derivative] actions."46 Although the Court technically left open 
on remand the question whether in this particular case federal law for-
bade such termination under state law, Justice Brennan's majority 
opinion suggests that it does not.47 If the Court finds the state law con-
sistent with the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts, 
which were intended to deal with the especially difficult problems of 
conflicts of interest of investment advisers and directors of investment 
companies,48 probably it will also find the state law to be consistent 
with most or all federallaw,49 except federal laws expressly providing 
for derivative suits.5o 
The Special Litigation Committee 
Although the courts generally have held that the board's refusal to 
sue will not block a derivative suit naming a majority of the directors as 
defendants,51 a few corporations facing such actions recently have es-
tablished committees of allegedly independent directors to investigate 
the allegations of shareholders' complaints and have argued that the 
decisions of such committees not to sue warrant dismissal of the deriva-
tive suits. Nearly all of these "special litigation committee" cases have 
involved attacks on questionable payments. Such cases raise several 
unusual issues, and thus may be of limited precedential value to other 
kinds of derivative suits.52 Nevertheless, acceptance of the corpora-
46 99 S. Ct. at 1841. 
47 The Court stated that "Congress consciously chose to address the conflict of interest prob-
lem through the Act's independent directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies," 
and that "when Congress did intend to prevent board action from cutting off derivative suits, it 
said so expressly." I d. at 1840. Justices Stewart and Powell, concurring, saw no "danger that state 
law will conflict with federal policy," id. at 1842, although Justice Blackmun, concurring, stated 
that such conflicts "could very well exist ... " Id. at 1841. 
4 8 Id. at 1838-39. 
49 See Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding state law 
permitting board termination of derivative suits consistent with rule lOb-5); Maldonado v. Flynn, 
No. 77-3180, slip. op. at 8-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (finding board termination consistent with 
Securities Exchange Act § 14(a)); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244-45 (D. 
Minn. 1978) (distinguishing the Court of Appeals decision in Lasker and holding that the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 does not preclude use of the business judgment rule to block a deriva-
tive suit), aff'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, !00 S. Ct. 670 (1980). But see Galef v. 
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip. op. at 5920-21 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (finding board termination 
inconsistent with Securities Exchange Act § 14(a) where all directors were defendants). 
50 For example, state procedural obstacles to derivative suits (such as contemporaneous own-
ership and posting of security for expenses) often are held inapplicable to suits under§ 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976). See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 1046 {2d ed. 1961); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1175 (4th ed. 1977). 
Thus, courts will probably hold that the power of the board to terminate a§ 16(b) suit is governed 
by federal law. 
51 See note 31 supra. 
52 See notes 169-74 and accompanying text infta. 
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tions' arguments has disturbing implications. 
One of the first cases to consider this argument, Gall v. Exxon 
Corp.,53 is typical. In 1975 Exxon's board of directors established a 
Special Committee on Litigation to investigate allegations by Gall and 
others regarding questionable payments made by Exxon's Italian sub-
sidiary and to determine whether the corporation should sue any of its 
own or its subsidiary's officers or directors regarding such payments.s4 
The con1mittee concluded that the president of the subsidiary had 
made substantial unauthorized payments55 and that several directors of 
Exxon named as defendants in Gall knew of the payments at the time 
they were made.56 The committee concluded, however, that it would 
be detrimental to Exxon and its shareholders for Exxon, or anyone on 
its behalf, to sue any Exxon director or officer, and the committee 
therefore authorized Exxon's officers and general counsel to oppose all 
derivative suits relating to the payments.57 The committee cited as rea-
sons for its decision the poor prospects for success of the litigation, the 
cost of conducting the litigation, the interruption of corporate affairs, 
and the undermining of personnel morale. 5 8 
Despite the committee's conclusions, several shareholders contin-
ued the suit against several Exxon directors. The defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint in reliance on the committee's decision. Al-
though the court initially denied the motion, the denial was a pyrrhic 
victory for plaintiffs. The court, holding that the matter was governed 
by the business judgment rule, rejected all plaintiffs' arguments that the 
use of the special committee was inherently defective59 and denied de-
fendants' motion only for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs to con-
duct discovery to determine whether the committee members had acted 
in bad faith or were involved or interested in the alleged wrongs.60 Af-
ter plaintiffs had conducted this limited discovery, the court granted the 
53 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. !976). 
54 Jd. at 510-ll. 
55 Jd. at 51!. The committee found that the unauthorized payments totaled at least $29 mil-
lion, plus $27.9 million in contributions to Italian political parties. The president of the subsidiary 
maintained secret bank accounts to facilitate these payments. 
56 Jd. at 512. 
57 Jd. at 514. 
58 Jd. at 514 n.l3. 
59 Plaintiffs had argued that, since the full board of Exxon remained free to override the com-
mittee's resolution, the decision not to sue was in effect the decision of the full board, which was 
dominated by the defendants, and that the refusal to sue amounted to an impermissible ratifica-
tion of illegal acts. /d. at 516-17. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text infta. Moreover, the 
court found "not a scintilla of evidence" that the Italian payments were in any way illegal. 418 F. 
Supp. at 518-19. In light of the latter finding, the result in Gall may be correct, although the 
court's path to that result is objectionable. 
60 418 F. Supp. at 519-2!. The court also spoke of determining whether the committee mem-
bers were "independent" but the court's opinion makes it clear that by independence the court 
meant nothing more than an absence of involvement in the questionable payments. The court's 
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renewed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaints.61 
In Auerbach v. Bennett,62 the most important case on point to date, 
the New York Court of Appeals ordered dismissal of a derivative suit 
on the ground that a special litigation committee of disinterested direc-
tors had decided to terminate the suit and that the business judgment 
rule placed this decision beyond judicial scrutiny so long as the com-
mittee had used appropriate "investigative methods."63 The unusual 
procedural sett1ng of the case leaves some doubt, however, as to the 
scope of the court's holding.64 
In other cases involving special litigation committees the courts 
generally have followed Gall and Auerbach, holding that judicial scru-
tiny of the board's refusal to sue is limited by the business judgment 
rule.65 They have divided, however, on whether to permit discovery or 
to dismiss without permitting even the limited discovery granted in 
Gall. Dismissal often has been premised on the plaintiffs failure to 
plead the bad faith or lack of independence of the committee.66 Al-
later opinion followed this definition of independence. Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op. 
at 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977). 
61 Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977). 
62 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
63 /d. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. 
64 The plaintiff did not appeal dismissal by the trial court. Another shareholder then inter-
vened and prosecuted the appeaL The intervenor, however, was saddled with Auerbach's com-
plaint, the allegations of which were weak on the issues of the committee's Jack of independence 
and the inadequacy of the committee's investigation. 65 Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979); Abbey v. Control 
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 
No. 77-3180 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979); 
Rosengarten v. International Tel & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Parkoffv. Gen-
eral TeL & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. 
App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 
1980); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at II, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Auerbach v. 
Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.LJ., 
Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see Jamieson v. Jamieson, N.Y.LJ., June 23, 1976, 
at 8, col. I (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d 
875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (Sup. Ct. 1977) (business judgment rule is not conclusive on issue of exces-
siveness of executive compensation). Contra, Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 
1980), discussed in note 254 infra. Cf Galef v. Alexander, No. 79-7166 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) 
(business judgment rule does not apply where all directors are named as defendants). 
66 See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978) (summary 
judgment granted where plaintiff conceded good faith and independence of committee), o/fd, 603 
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, JOO S. Ct. 670 (1980); Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. 
at 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (summary judgment granted where complaint failed to chal-
lenge disinterestedness or independence of committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (summary judgment ordered where plaintiff raised no ques-
tion of independence of or adequacy of investigation by committee); Auerbach v. Aldrich, 
N.Y.LJ., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff 
alleged no fraud or self-dealing by committee members). q. Bennett v. Instrument Systems 
Corp., 66 A.D.2d 708, 411 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978) (nonmanagement directors' affidavits of 
nondomination warranted summary judgment where plaintiff offered no controverting evidence). 
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though the courts seem to agree that such a pleading entitles the plain-
tiff to at least limited discovery, several courts have adopted, without 
much consideration, a narrow concept of what constitutes a lack of in-
dependence, most indicating that only active involvement in the al-
leged wrongs negates independence.67 Except in Auerbach, there has 
been little discussion of what constitutes an adequate investigation by 
the noninterested directors;68 nor have the courts discussed the burden 
of proof as to independence, although it seems that the burden has 
But see Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(summary judgment granted following earlier postponement pending deposition of committee 
members); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. I 172, I 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting discovery on issue 
of independence of directors), 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment after discovery), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. I 978), rev'd, 99 
S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Levy v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 2, (Sup. Ct. 
1977). See also Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979) (limited discovery 
granted as to "validity and propriety" of board's resolution adopted on committee's recommenda-
tion); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, !980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. !980) (discovery lim-
ited to issues of committee's "good faith and independence"); Wallenstein v. Warner, N.Y.L.J., 
May 9, 1978, at I l, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (discovery permitted as to good faith and independence 
of the committee); Jamieson v. Jamieson, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1976, at 8, col. l (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Wechsler v. Exxon Corp., 55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (1977) (trial 
court denied motion to dismiss pending "total disclosure"; appellate court reversed for stay pend-
ing disposition of similar complaint in Gall). 
67 See Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,!53 (9th Cir. 1979) (court approved 
of presence on committee of one director, even though he was named as a defendant for having 
acquiesced in the transaction in question, because he did not profit therefrom); Maldonado v. 
Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip. op. at 15-!6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (committee member held in-
dependent although he was a partner with committee's special counsel); Rosengarten v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp .• 466 F. Supp. 8!7, 825 (S.D.N.Y. !979) (court held two outside directors 
disinterested as to suit challenging questionable payments, even though one was a defendant and 
the other a potential defendant in their capacities as directors for other corporations that had 
made questionable payments); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 
1977). q. Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op. at 4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977) (plaintiff 
must show directors "were either personally involved ... or at least sufficiently interested in" the 
alleged wrongs); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d 
920, 927 (1979) (no triable issue as to independence of directors who were not on board and had 
no affiliation with corporation at time of alleged wrongs). But if. Wallenstein v. Warner, 
N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1978, at II, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (possible knowledge of wrongdoing by commit-
tee member raised question as to his independence). See also Abbey v. Control Data Corp .. 460 
F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978), ajj'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 
670 ( !980) (plaintiff conceded committee's independence). 
68 The court in Auerbach held that courts may inquire into the directors' selection of investiga-
tive procedures, but rna y not, absent a showing of bad faith, inquire into the directors' weighing of 
factors after the conclusion of the investigation. Since the complaint did not challenge the ade-
quacy of the investigation, however, summary judgment was appropriate on this point. Auerbach 
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633-34, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928-29. (1979). See 
also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3!80, slip op. at 20-21 (S.D.N. Y. Jan. 24, !980) (following 
Auerbach); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824-26 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (court found investigation adequate, though not without flaws); Abbey v. Control Data 
Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978), ajj'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
100 S. Ct. 670 (1980) (plaintiff conceded adequacy of committee's investigation). 
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been placed on the plaintiff to prove a want of independence.69 
Summary and Implications 
The special litigation committee cases may presage the demise of 
the derivative suit. When faced with a derivative suit, defendant direc-
tors will invariably request an investigation and decision by some fel-
low directors as to whether the suit is in the best interests of the 
corporation. The defendants have nothing to lose in so doing-at 
worst, the nonimplicated directors will decide to take over the suit, or 
to take a neutral stance toward the suit, leaving the defendants no 
worse off than when they started. More important, the prospect of such 
a decision is minimal; almost invariably, the directors charged with the 
decision decide to oppose the suit.7° In most cases, this opposition will 
result in dismissal of the suit unless the deciding directors are shown to 
be directly implicated in the alleged wrong or are so clumsy as to be 
found to have acted in bad faith. 71 Such opposition can even block 
plaintiffs discovery as to defendants' alleged misdeeds.n 
It is doubtful whether the shareholders' derivative suit deserves the 
sudden interment it is being given.73 At the very least, pronouncement 
of this death sentence by the courts constitutes unjustifiable judicial 
legislation. More shocking is that the courts have neither offered a ra-
tionale for condemning the derivative suit nor even acknowledged that 
they have condemned it. One hQpes that the courts simply do not real-
ize that they are endangering the derivative suit and that once they do 
realize it they will act quickly to reverse the trend by significantly re-
stricting the board's power to terminate derivative suits. 
PROPOSED STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
When, if ever, should the· decision not to sue, made by the full 
board of directors or a special litigation committee of supposedly disin-
terested directors, serve to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit? 
Clearly, not every derivative suit should be allowed to proceed in the 
face of the board's opposition. Even a meritorious suit may produce 
significant litigation costs for the corporation, diversion of corporate 
employees, detriment to personnel morale, and adverse publicity far 
outweighing any benefit that might be derived from a judgment in be-
half of the corporation.74 If the suit is groundless, the cost to the corpo-
69 See note 184 infra. 
70 Although there are no statistics available, there are many reported cases where the directors 
have refused to sue after receiving a demand. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 26-29 & 43-58 supra. 
In no case known to the author have the directors agreed to sue. 
71 See notes 25, 59, 62 & 65 and accompanying text supra. 
72 See notes 60-6 I & 66 and accompanying text supra. 
73 See note 3 supra. 
74 See generally text accompanying n~tes I62-64 & 232-40 infra. 
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ration is incurred without any compensating benefit, and is often 
compounded by the necessary indemnification of the defendants for at-
torneys' fees. 75 
Yet, the existence of some suits that should not be brought does 
not mean that directors should be able to terminate all derivative suits 
at will. The importance of derivative suits in protecting minority share-
holders from abuses by corporate insiders has been well-documented.76 
The courts have recognized that the very insiders accused of injuring 
the corporation cannot be expected to sue themselves, and thus have 
held that the refusal of the full board to sue a majority of its members 
does not bar a derivative suit.77 There are also good reasons for a court 
to be skeptical even where the refusal to sue is made by a committee of 
supposedly disinterested directors. 
Both inside and outside directors and their counsel are subject to 
heavy pressures not to take steps adverse to their fellow directors.7B 
Even genuinely independent directors cannot be expected to investigate 
alleged wrongs by their colleagues with the zeal of a plaintiffs attorney 
motivated by the prospect of receiving a large fee if he is successfu1_79 
Where the corporation may have been injured by persons unaffiliated 
with the corporation, however, the directors can be expected to weigh 
dispassionately the merits of a suit to seek redress. Accordingly, the 
board should be able to terminate suits against unaffiliated persons 
subject only to compliance with the business judgment rule, but the 
board should never be able to block a derivative suit in which a major-
ity of the directors is implicated. Moreover, where any derivative suit 
implicates a minority of the directors or other insiders, board opposi-
tion to the suit should not lead to dismissal unless the court is satisfied 
after weighing several factors that dismissal is appropriate. 
Suits Implicating a Majority o.f the Directors 
Where a majority of the directors is implicated in a wrong alleged 
in a derivative suit, a refusal to sue by either the full board or a com-
mittee established by the full board should never block the suit. 
Neither the directors nor outside counsel can be truly independent in 
such cases. Moreover, the shareholders have a right to something more 
than an objective investigation by disinterested persons. 
75 Indemnity of a director or officer who defends a derivative suit with some success is often 
required or permitted by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAW§§ 721-727 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-1980); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 380. Corporate 
by-laws and charters and employment agreements often provide for indemnification where per· 
mitted by law. See id. § 379. 
76 See note 3 supra. 
77 See note 31 supra. 
78 See text accompanying notes 80-115 i'!fra. 
79 See text accompanying notes 116-29 i'!fra. 
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Independence if the Directors.-When charges are leveled against 
a majority of the directors, the pressures on even nonimplicated direc-
tors are so great as to justify a conclusive presumption that they cannot 
independently investigate and weigh the facts and reach a conclusion 
that is in the best interest of the corporation. This presumption is sup-
ported both by scholarly analyses of dire~tors' behavior_ and b~ com-
parisons to other areas of the law where mdependence IS reqmred of 
those who sit in judgment of others. 
Most apparent is the probable lack of independence of inside di-
rectors-those who are also officers of the corporation. If the defend-
ants in the derivative suit include his superior officers, the inside 
director cannot be expected to act independently; the same officers 
whom he is to judge will determine his future salary, fringe benefits, 
and promotions.80 Even if the defendants are subordinates of the in-
side director, his investigation will not likely be dispassionate. Corpo-
rate officers cannot run a business effectively without the cooperation of 
lower level managers,81 and a decision to sue a subordinate could well 
undermine the cooperation of lower officers generally by instilling fear 
that upper management will not be loyal to them. Furthermore, an 
inside director's decision to sue subordinate officers could raise embar-
rassing questions, and the prospect of liability, with respect to his selec-
tion and supervision of subordinates. 82 
The independence of outside directors also may be compromised 
in many ways. The selection of outside directors is usually controlled 
by the senior management of the corporation, 83 which seeks to name 
80 M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 144-45 (1976); M. MACE, DIREC-
TORS: MYTH AND REALITY 119-20 (1971); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board o/ Direc-
tors: Fond Hope-Fain/ Promise? 76 MICH. L. REv. 581, 584 (1978). See Leech & Mundheim, 
The Outside Director if the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799, 1803-04 (1976). 
81 Indeed, it is sometimes posited that effective power in the corporation "is lodged deeply in 
the technical, planning and other specialized staff," and that interference with the technocracy by 
higher management creates serious problems. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 69 
(1967). 
82 Officers and directors may be held liable for negligence in selecting or supervising corporate 
agents or employees. H. HENN, supra note I,§ 234, at 456. See generally 3A W. FL~TCHER, supra 
note 14, §§ I 065-1100. 
83 Often the chief executive officer nominates new outside directors. HEIDRJCK & STRUGGLES, 
l~c., THE CHANGING BOARD 8 (1977) (in 46.5% of 1,000 corporations surveyed, the chief execu-
hve officer is "the initial decisionmaker regarding a prospective director"). See also C. BROWN, 
PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 28 (1976); M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146; M. 
MAcE, supra note 80, at 94, 108; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View 
of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1233-34 ( 1977); 
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; Soderquist, Toward a More Ejfeclive Corporate Board· 
Reexamining Roles o/ Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1341, 1350 (1977). Cf Wharton 
School of Finance and Co=erce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 34 (1962) (independent directors of mutual funds are selected by the controlling management 
group). It is widely recognized that, absent exceptional circumstances, nomination is tantamount 
to election. C. BROWN, supra, at 23; Weiss & Schwartz, Disclosure Approach for Directors, 56 
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individuals who will not "rock the boat."84 Most outside directors 
share similar social and professional backgrounds and general attitudes 
with their inside director colleagues. 85 Most are themselves corporate 
executives,86 often with firms that do business with the corporation,s? 
and thus are unlikely to look favorably on shareholder interference 
with management generally, or on derivative suits seeking to foist lia-
bility on corporate directors. 88 Outside directors are often friends of 
high executives in the corporation before becoming directors, 89 and 
even if not, friendships among directors naturally grow during their 
tenures on the board. Furthermore, the outside director is indebted to 
his fellow directors for the income and prestige he derives from his 
position, and he depends on those same directors for the continued re-
. . . 
HARV. Bus. REv. 18, 24 (Jan.-Feb. 1978). Management control of nominations is reduced when, 
as is_ becoming more common, the nomination of new directors is handled by a committee of 
outside directors, but even in these cases the committee is likely to bow to management's sugges-
tions. Solomon, supra note 80, at 605-06. At the very least, the chief executive officer usually has 
a tacit veto power over new nominations. Coffee, supra, at 1233. But see "Independent" Panels of 
Corporate Baards to Tap New Directors Are Prol(ferating, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 12, coL 2 
(citing view that nominating committees will bring "a more objective approach to director selec-
tion, which will result in more independent directors and decisions"). 
84 M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146. Accord, M. MACE, supra note 80, at 99, 108; Leech & 
Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1826-27; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584-85. See also Nutt, A Study 
o_f Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 219 (1971) ("[A] reasonable man 
... will not join a board [of a mutual fund] if he knows that he cannot support the existing fund-
adviser relationship .... "). 
85 Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24. See Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside Directors; 
52 HARV. Bus. REV. 70,71 (July-Aug. 1974). See generally G. DoMHOFF, THE BOHEMIAN GROVE 
AND OTHER RETREATS (1974); G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES (1970). 
86 J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF THE 
BoARD 29, 39 (1973); M. MACE, supra note 80, at 87, 96-97, 106; Nutt, supra note 84, at 217; 
Soderquist, supra note 83, at !350-51; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 & n.l3; Weiss & Schwartz, 
supra note 83, at 24. 
87 Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11 (1972); Solomon, supra note 80, at 
590. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; CJ. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146 
("approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the outside directors ... are lawyers or investment 
bankers," most of whom "are suppliers of services to the corporation"). But see Lubin, Outsiders 
In: Firms Adding More Independent Directors But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches, Wall 
St. J., May 26, 1978, at 38, coL 1 (stating that recently fewer outside directors have been "quasi-
insiders"). 
88 See Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 & n.l3. But if. Rosengarten v. International TeL & Tel. 
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held two outside directors disinterested as to 
suit challenging questionable payments even though one was a defendant and the other a poten-
tial defendant in their capacities as directors for other corporations that had made questionable 
payments). 
89 M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146; M. MACE, supra note 80, at 95, 97-100; Solomon, 
supra note 80, at 584-85. See J. BACON, supra note 86, at 28 & Table 4. But if Corporate Rights 
and Responsibt1ities: Hearings Bifore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 
(1976) (statement of Richard M. Cyert) ("[r]ecruitment [of new directors] is not a question of the 
president getting his friends on the board") [hereinafter cited as Corporate Rights Hearings]. See 
also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1831 
(1979). 
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ceipt of these benefits. 9o 
Both inside and outside directors are discouraged from indepen-
dence by pressures to conform, sometimes referred to as "group-
think."9I The pressure to conform is great enough in ordinary matters 
of corporate planning, where board rejection of a management propo-
sal would produce nothing more than annoyance.92 The pressure is 
much more onerous when the directors are asked to subject a fellow 
director to a suit that could lead to major financial liability, loss of job, 
and public humiliation.93 When a minority of directors is asked to sue 
the majority, the pressure may be unbearable.94 Abstention by or 
recusal of the interested directors does not solve the problem.95 Al-
90 Selection of outside directors by management inspires feelings of loyalty to management 
among the directors so selected. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 146-47; Moscow, supra note 87, 
at 11. If feelings of loyalty are inadequate to the purpose, the chief executive officer's power over 
renomination of incumbents may do the trick. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 147; Leech & 
Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830; Solomon, supra note 80, at 605-06. See also HEIDRICK & 
STRUGGLES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BoARD OF DIRECTORS )) (1971) (nearly 37% of corporations 
surveyed reported "firing" directors). But if M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 147 n.40 (noting 
ambiguity in this statistic). 
9I See Coffee, supra note 83, at 1233-34. But see Corporate Rights Hearings, supra note 89, at 
!40. At the very least, the clubby atmosphere and traditional etiquette of the corporate board-
room undermine any inclination toward independence. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 52, 54; Soder-
quist, supra note 83, at 1361 n.J20. . 
92 Outside directors who oppose management may be told that such behavior is "inappropri-
ate" or may be asked to resign. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 80. Usually the board will not act 
until a problem has reached crisis proportions. Jd. at 41; Solomon, supra note 80, at 583. SeeM. 
EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 140-41, 170; Solomon, supra note 80, at 584 n.l3, 585; Weiss & 
Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24. 
93 See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 
1831 (1979), where the court of appeals said, "It is asking too much of human nature to expect that 
the disinterested directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in 
a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liabil-
ity for the individuals concerned." See also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 750 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976). 
Even where the issue is not a suit against directors but dissatisfaction with the chief executive 
officer, the directors usually keep silent or resign. M. MACE, supra note 80, at 33-36. See Weiss & 
Schwartz, supra note 83, at 24. 
94 See Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), whe.re t.he court 
stated: 
The court should not cajole itself into believing that the members of a Board of Directors 
elected by the dominant and accused majority stockholder, after accusations of wrongdoing 
h~ve been made, were selected for membership on the Board to protect the interests of the 
mmority stockholders and to assure a vigorous prosecution of effective litigation against the 
offending majority. Where we know that puppet directors would at best only go through the 
motions, are we barred from considering who would be manipulating the wires? 
95 See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1965), cerl. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 
(1966), where Judge Hays said in dissent: "No one who knows anything about the conduct of 
~orporate enterprise considers that the major stockholders' withdrawal from the room when a vote 
Is taken amounts to anything more than an empty ceremonial." See also Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 405 F.2d 200, 215 n.2 (2d Cir.) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
bane) (majority opinion by Hays, J.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). · 
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though most studies confronting the problem of lack of independen 
among corporate directors have recommended approaches to producece 
more independent board,96 it has been questioned whether any of the a 
recommendations can succeed.97 For present purposes, however su~~ 
recommendations are superfluous: if minority directors cannot dispas. 
sionately decide whether to sue the majority, the solution is to allow th 
derivativ:e suit to proceed and let a court decide the case on its merits.9; 
The inherent conflict of interest that arises when directors are 
asked to pass judgment on fell?w directors has been t_acit~y recognized 
by statutes and case law regardmg other aspects of denvatlve suits. For 
example, although most state statutes provide mechanisms for board 
resolution of matters in which some directors are interested,99 the 
courts have nonetheless relieved the shareholder of the burden of mak-
ing a demand on the board before commencing a derivative suit impli-
cating a majority of the board. 100 The courts have recognized that such 
a demand would be pointless since no action by the independent direc-
tors could be considered determinative of whether the derivative suit 
should proceed. 101 Similarly, in many derivative suits the courts have 
insisted that the corporation appear by independent counsel, or even 
96 See C. BROWN, supra note 83, at 33 (arguing that the chief executive officer should be the 
only inside director); M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 175-76 (suggesting a majority of independ-
ent directors who also control proxy machinery); Coffee, supra note 83, at 1234 (stressing in-
dependent nominating committee); Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830 (emphasizing 
independent nominating committee); Moscow, supra note 87, at 11-12 (suggesting random selec-
tion from list of eligible directors); Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of 
Directors, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 63, 99 (1977) (advocating greater disclosure of directors' 
backgrounds and activities). 
97 See generally Solomon, note 80 supra. 
98 The author's present purpose is not to question the efficacy of outside directors, although 
others have raised such questions. M. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 140-41; Solomon, supra note 
80, at 6 !0 & n.l23. Even if one concedes that outside directors can often be effective, it is too 
much to expect them to be genuinely independent and disinterested in deciding whether their 
colleagues should be sued. 
99 The mechanisms include delegation of board powers to a committee, see Note, Executive 
Committees-Creation, Procedures, and Authoril)', 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42, 42 n.4 (1967) (list of 
such state statutes), and empowering the noninterested directors to act for the board even if they 
do not otherwise constitute a quorum, see, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975); N.Y. Bus. 
CORP. LAW§ 713 (McKinney 1963). 
100 See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. 
101 q. Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978) (possibility that 
interested directors might disqualify themselves did not justify requiring demand on board with 
two interested and two noninterested directors). It would create an awkward, if not anomalous, 
situation if, in a suit against a majority of the directors, the plaintiff did not have to make a 
demand on the board, but the noninterested minority directors could subsequently terminate the 
suit. If cases like Gall are to be followed, it would seem logical to require a demand on the board 
in all derivative suits. See Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) 
(complaint dismissed for failure to make demand on board where board had established a litiga-
tion committee). 
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that the corporation take a neutral stand on the suit. 102 Here again, the 
courts' decisions would make no sense if the board could simply estab-
lish an allegedly disinterested committee to determine which position 
counsel should take on a derivative suit. Where the suit involves trans-
actions between a corporation and its insiders, the courts have insisted 
that even the approval of noninterested directors does not render care-
ful judicial scrutiny of the fairness of the transactions unnecessary. 103 
In considering whether a minority of directors can be sufficiently 
independent to weigh a suit against the majority, useful perspective 
may be gained from the standards of disinterestedness required of triers 
of law and fact in judicial and arbitral proceedings. Because bias is so 
hard to prove 104 and because it is essential that the judicial resolution 
of disputes be fair not only in fact but also in appearance, the law often 
disqualifies from certain roles in the dispute resolution process anyone 
who has an apparent conflict of interest in the dispute, even though his 
integrity is unimpeachable. A judge must recuse himself sua sponte 
whenever his impartiality might be reasonably questioned, 105 or on the 
102 Although the corporation must be a nominal defendant in a derivative suit, the suit is none-
theless brought on its behalf and it stands to benefit from any judgment for plaintiff. The question 
· arises whether the corporation may interpose defenses to the action. There is little helpful author-
ity on this point. N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 109, at 435. See generally Washington, Stockholders' 
Derivative Suits: The Company's Role, and a Suggestion, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 361 (1940). A f~<w 
cases have held that the corporation may not interpose any defense. Meyers v. Smith, 190 Minn. 
157, 159,251 N.W. 20,21 (1933) (per curiam); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616,626,61 
A. 1061, 1064-65 (1905). Others have permitted the corporation to interpose defenses when its 
interests lie in resisting the suit. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (E.D. 
Pa. 1944), ajf'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 181 
A.D. 75, 78, 168 N.Y.S. 251,254 (1917) (dictum), ajf'dmem., 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 908 (1920). It 
has been suggested that the corporation be permitted to interpose defenses designed to protect the 
corporation, but not those designed to protect the alleged wrongdoers. 66 HARV. L. REV. 342 
(1952). See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 5997. Of course, the line between the two types of 
defenses is very hazy. · 
A related question is whether the corporation and the alleged wrongdoers may be represented 
by the same counsel. See generally Tockman, The Position of Corporate Counsel in .Derivative 
Actions, 51 ILL B.J. 654, 659-60 (1963); Note, Independent Representation for Corporate .Defend-
ants in .Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.J. 524 (1965). Some courts have held that they may. Otis & 
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E. D. Pa. 1944), ajf'd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d 
Cir. 1946); Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 278-79, 72 A.2d 294, 299 (1950). Others have held 
that they may not. Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213-20 (N.D. Ill. 
1975), mod!fied on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. 
Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Langer v. Garay, 30 A.D.2d 942, 293 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968) (per 
curiam); Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc., 9 A.D.2d 760,760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (1959) (per 
curiam). 
103 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text infra. 
104 See Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (although majority 
appeared disinterested, demand on board excused because "tangible indications of bias on the 
part of the unaffiliated majority are rarely present"); Greene v. Allen, 35 Del. Ch. 242, 114 A.2d 
916, 920 (1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (near impossibility of proving bad faith with respect to a subjective evaluation). 
105 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) requires the judge to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his 
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motion of a party a~eging facts suggesting part~ality, ~ven_if the judge 
feels the suggestiOn 1s unwarranted. 106 Even fnendship w1th an inter-
ested nonparty has been held sufficient to mandate recusal. 107 Simi. 
larly, a juror may be disqualified for cause if he has an interest in the 
case or has any substantial connection, such as an employment rela-
tionship, with any party. 108 Comparable rules apply to arbitration 109 
and administrative proceedings. 110 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," or where he has a personal bias. Semble, ABA 
CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(l). A judge must also recuse himself when he has even 
a small financial interest in the case, including ownership of stock in a party-corporation. In re 
Honolulu Canso!. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917). Semble, ABA CoDE OF JuDICIAL CoN-
DUCT, Canon 3(C)(l)(c). By comparison, the impartiality of a committee member owning stock in 
the corporation is surely open to question; the committee member's compensation as a director 
usually exceeds his monetary interest as a stockholder, thus clearly suggesting bias in favor of the 
accused directors who control that compensation. And even though his interest as a stockholder 
might give the director an identity of interest with the plaintiff-shareholder, it should be noted that 
a judge must recuse himself for financial interest even if the presumably injured party does not 
request it. 
106 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976). If the movant's affidavit gives "fair support to the charge of a bent 
of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment," the judge must recuse himself 
regardless of the truth of the allegations. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-35 (1921); 
United States v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 715, 717-18 (D. Del. 1976), a.lf'd mem., 566 F.2d 1171 (3d 
Cir. 1977). See also CAL. C1v. PRoc. CODE§ 170.6 (West Supp. 1979). 
107 United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.W. Va. 1976). 
108 See State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 383, 151 S.E.2d 308, 320 (1966) (a master or servant of, 
or anyone who is "of the same society or corporation with," a party should be disqualified) (quot-
ing as dictum State v. Dushman, 79 W.Va. 747,91 S.E. 809 (1917)). See also Henslee v. State, 251 
Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971) (under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1920 (Rep!. 1964) employee of 
plaintiff-corporation was properly dismissed); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Langdon, 187 Colo. 425, 532 
P.2d 337 (1975) (en bane) (under CoLO. R. C1v. P. 47(e)(3), an employee may be challenged for 
cause); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 207 S.E.2d 543 (1974). 
109 Arbitration proceedings require the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality. See 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968); American Ea-
gle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 398, 405, 148 N.E. 562, 564 (1925) ("An arbitra-
tor acts in a quasi-judicial proceeding and should possess the judicial qualifications of fairness to 
both parties .... ");Labor Relations Section ofN.N.Y. Builders Exch. Inc. v. Gordon, 41 A.D.2d 
25, 27, 341 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1973). See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF CoM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION§ 21.01-04 (1968). 
Federal and state arbitration laws require modifying or vacating awards by biased arbitra-
tors. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976); N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 75ll(b)(l)(ii) (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. 
ANN.§ 298.10(l)(b) (West 1958). ' 
Regular business dealings with a party will disqualify an arbitrator. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. 
Rytex Corp., 41 A.D.2d 15, 18, 340 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (1973), qff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 123, 312 N.E.2d 
466, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1974); Petroleum Cargo Carriers Ltd. v. Unitas, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 222, 226, 
220 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1961), qff'd mem., 15 A.D.2d 735, 224 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1962). 
110 Due process requires trial by an impartial tribunal in an adminstrative proceeding. 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975). The rules governing disqualification for bias and 
interest apply equally to courts and administrative agencies. See B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW§§ 106-109 (1976). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT§§ 12.01-.04, 12.06 
(3d ed. 1972). Section 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. § 556(b) (1976), pro-
vides a disqualification procedure similar to that for federal judges discussed in notes 105 & 106 
supra. See B. ScHWARTZ, supra, § 109. Even a fairly remote financial interest in the case will 
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A corporate board considering whether or not to bring suit is, con-
cededly, in a somewhat different position than a judge, jury, arbitrator, 
or administrative tribunal resolving a dispute. The board must weigh 
not only the legal rights of the parties but also the total costs of the 
litigation to the corporation. 111 Nonetheless, the fact and appearance 
of impartiality are important not only to the particular corporation but 
to the entire corporate governance system. To ensure both the fact and 
the appearance of impartiality, the nonimplicated minority of directors 
should be presumed to have a conflict of interest and should not be 
permitted to act as judge and jury in deciding whether a derivative suit 
should proceed against a majority of their fellow directors. 
Perhaps nonimplicated directors should not even be asked to 
weigh a suit against their colleagues. Two problems are evident. First, 
if the nonimplicated directors believe the accused directors guilty of 
serious wrongs to the corporation, they are, as a practical matter, con-
strained to ask the accused directors to resign from all corporate posts, 
and the accused directors might feel it only honorable to acquiesce. 
This action may, as a practical matter, be irreversible, for even if the 
accused directors are ultimately vindicated in a derivative suit, it might 
be awkward to return them to their corporate positions. Therefore, 
.since a suit against their colleagues is such a destructive weapon, 
nonimplicated directors might decline to use it absent overwhelming 
evidence of grave wrongdoing. Second, since outside directors are sup-
posed to be watchdogs to management, using them to shield manage-
ment from shareholder suits is of questionable propriety. 112 These 
problems are easily solved by allowing a derivative suit to proceed. 
The nonimplicated directors could then await disposition of the suit to 
decide whether the accused directors should resign. This lesser 
weapon, the derivative suit, is not so destructive as to make its use un-
thinkable, so it also retains its deterrent value. 
Independence of Special Counsel .for the Minority Directors.-Mi-
~ority directorsoften are nonlawyers who have other principal occupa-
tions and little regular staff support. Often, therefore, they have neither 
the time nor the resources to conduct a thorough investigation· of the 
ch~rges raised by a derivative suit. As a result, a key role in the investi-
gation must be played by special outside counsel113 to the minority di-
disqualify one from adjudicating an administrative proceeding. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 
578:79 (1973) (licensed optometrists held barred from adjudicating license revocation proceedings 
a?amst other optometrists on grounds that license revocation might increase business for the adju-
dicators). 
III See text accompanying notes 232-40 i'!fra. 
Il2 See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1211 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979). 
II3 0 d" "1 . d d . r man y, m epen ent counsel means counsel other than the corporatiOn's house counsel 
or regular outside counsel, who are too financially dependent on the board to be disinterested. 
See Bishop, supra note 37 at 1080. 
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rectors. 114 Yet, even outside counsel may not be truly disinterested and 
effective. For example, the directors may select counsel with a reputa-
tion for indulgence toward accused directors, a reputation gained 
through lax investigations that curry favor with directors and enhance 
the counsel's prospects of being retained for similar future assignments 
by the same and other corporations. In short, counsel's self-interest 
may color his investigation and lead him to recommend against suing 
any director. 115 
The Shareholders' Perspective .-In addition to disinterested deci-
sionmakers, the Anglo-American legal system features adversary pro-
ceedings .in which key roles are played by persons who clearly are not 
disinterested-the parties to the dispute and their attorneys. 116 It is be-
lieved that the truth is more likely to emerge if each party, aided by 
skilled counsel, is free to advance his own case and to attack his oppo-
nent's case vigorously. 117 In theory, and to a large extent in practice, 
shareholders receive the benefits of an adversary proceeding in a deriv-
ative suit. Although the interest of the nominal plaintiff in the outcome 
is usually minimal, the interest of his attorney in receiving a generous 
court award of attorneys' fees, usually from the fund created by a set-
tlement or judgment in favor of the corporation, generally assures 
shareholders of vigorous and competent representation. 118 Moreover, 
114 See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979). 
115 Professor Bishop has stated well the problems of relying on theoretically independent coun-
sel with respect to indemnification of directors and officers: 
No one need question the honesty of these darlings of corporate draftsmen: the problem 
rather is that those who choose them are pretty sure to favor a lawyer who was acquired in 
the course of a corporate practice a sympathetic understanding of the problems of corporate 
management. It is not easy for even a lawyer of the most rugged integrity to be harsh to 
people who were responsible for his retainer. But in fact counsel may well be a regular asso-
ciate and friend of the defendants: "independent" may turn out to mean nothing more than 
he is not an employee of the corporation. 
Bishop, supra note 37, at 1080 (footnote omitted). On at least one occasion independent counsel 
failed to convey to the board information he had obtained regarding illegal payments. Robertson, 
The Directors Woke Up Too Late at Gulf, FORTUNE, June, 1976, at 124. See also Coffee, supra 
note 83, at 1127-28 (describing cases where outside counsel was lethargic in conducting investiga-
tions of reported wrongdoing). 
116 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[A] common law 
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding."). See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 4 (2d ed. 1977). For criticism of the adversary system, see Frankel, The 
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975). See also F. JAMES & G. 
HAZARD, supra, § 1.2, at 7; Rosenberg, The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000, 74 CASE & 
CoM. 3, 10 (1969). Much of the criticism has focused on the assumption that all parties will be 
represented by equally skillful counsel. 
117 F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 1.2, at 5; A. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF 
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION I (1956). The moral acceptability 
of decisions is also enhanced when judges are not involved in initiating and conducting the case. 
See F. JAMES&. G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 1.2, at 5. 
118 The motivation for the suit is usually the hope of attorneys' fees. Smolowe v. Delendo 
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the power of the court to disapprove settlements and discontinuances 119 
helps ensure that plaintiff and his counsel will not agree to a disposition 
of the case that places their own interests ahead of those of the share-
holders.120 :, 
When a derivative suit is dismissed due to the opposition of the 
board of directors, the benefits of an adversary proceeding are lost to 
the shareholders. No plaintiff presents himself to press the interests of 
the shareholders; special counsel to the directors is charged not with 
advocating the shareholders' interests but with being fair and objective; 
and the special counsel's fee does not depend on, and therefore is not 
an incentive for, procuring a settlement or judgment in favor of the 
shareholders. 121 Shareholders are entitled to be represented by one 
who has a strong incentive to ferret out all evidence of wrongdoing. 
Unfortunately, although plaintiffs attorney in a derivative suit has 
such an incentive, he may have little incentive to consider the cost to 
the corporation of protracted litigation. In other words, plaintiffs at-
torney has little reason to consider whether it is in the best interests of 
the corporation, and of its shareholders generally, to proceed with the 
derivative suit. On balance, however, this problem is less serious than 
the potential for a biased decision by minority directors to oppose the 
suit.I22 
Shareholders may not fare much better where the decision not to 
sue is rendered by a special litigation committee created by the board. 
In many if not all states, the full board, which by hypothesis the alleged 
wrongdoers dominate, may dissolve or overrule the committee. 123 The 
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (referring to suits under 
§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 114, at 448. To en-
courage effort by plaintiffs' attorneys, awards of attorneys' fees for successful plaintiffs have usu-
ally been generous. See W. CARY, supra note I, at 980-82. As to the competence of plaintiffs' 
lawyers, see Note, Security .for Expenses in Shareholders' .Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 59 (1968). 119 As to the requirement of court approval of settlements and discontinuances, see notes 209-
10 and accompanying text in.fra. · 120 See Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996 & n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965); 
Craftsman Fin. & Mort. Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); H. HENN, supra note 
I,§ 375, at 790; Haudek, supra note I, at 768-71. See also note 211 iqfra. 121 Indeed, counsel is likely to have a strong interest in conducting the investigation in such a 
way that the directors will decide to oppose any derivative suit. See note 115 and accompanying 
text supra. 
122 See text accompanying notes 232-40 in.fra. 123 Several states expressly provide that the committee shall serve at the pleasure of the board, 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.63(c) 
(Anderson 1978), or that a majority of the full board may "abolish any such committee at its 
pleasure," N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-9(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979-1980), or that the committee shall be 
subject to the direction and control of the board, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4)(8) (West Supp. 
1979). See also 7 F. WHITE, NEW YORK CORPORATIONS~ 712.03 (13th ed. 1979); note 125 iq/ra. 
Where statute does not grant and the full board has not expressly reserved such power, it is un-
clear whether the board may dissolve or overrule a committee. Several courts have held that, 
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alleged wrongdoers thus occupy an enviable position. If the committee 
decides against suit, the accused directors may raise that decision as 
grounds for dismissal of a subsequent derivative suit, but if the com-
mittee chooses to sue or appears to be leaning in that direction, the 
board can simply overrule or disband the committee. In Gall v. Exxon 
Corp., 124 the court rejected plaintiff's argument that, for these reasons, 
the litigation committee proceeding should not raise a valid defense. 
The court seemed to assume that the board could not dissolve or over-
rule the committee, although the court cited no authority for this other 
than Exxon's by-laws and the wrong part of a New Jersey statute.l2s 
The danger is not purely hypothetical: in at least one case, a corporate 
board did dissolve a committee that seemed to be taking its job seri-
ously.126 
The investigation conducted by theoretically disinterested direc-
tors has other shortcomings from the shareholders' perspective-nota-
bly, the inability to compel testimony under oath or the production of 
documents pursuant to court-supervised discovery. Although informa-
tion may be obtainable from employees of the corporation, such infor-
mation rna y not be sufficient to determine whether to sue. Full 
discovery is vital to the development of any case against corporate di-
rectors, and the inability of disinterested directors to compel testimony 
or the production of documents raises a suspicion that their investiga-
tion may not adequately protect the interests of shareholders, even 
where the directors proceed energetically. 
Reliance on a decision by supposedly disinterested directors also 
deprives shareholders of the opportunity to persuade a court to modify 
existing law and the right to appeal adverse decisions on questions of 
law. While the plaintiff in a derivative suit can argue that the court 
notwithstanding the literal language of the relevant statutes, the board is limited in the powers it 
can delegate to a committee. See Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co., 181 F. 289 (1st Cir. 
1910); Note, Executive Committees-Creation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42, 
59-63 (1967). One commentator has suggested that because the committee is created by the board 
to assist in managmement, "there should be no question that the board may control the executive 
committee." /d. at 47. 
124 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a description of the case, see notes 53-61 and accom-
panying text supra. 
125 418 F. Supp. at 516-17. The court quoted N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-9(1) (West 1969), which 
generally empowers corporate boards to delegate to a committee "all the authority of the board" 
with certain exceptions. The court overlooked or ignored subsection (2) of§ 14A:6-9, which em-
powers the board to "(c) abolish any such committee at its pleasure; and (d) remove any director 
from membership on such committee at any time, with or without cause." Thus, the Exxon board 
could have dissolved the committee before it reached any decision. See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 
77-3180, slip op. at 14a (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (apparently concluding that committee's decision 
was not subject to board review). As to whether the board could overrule a decision of the com-
mittee, see note 123 supra. 
126 See Zale Consents to SEC Order Requiring 3 New Directors, Revamped Audit Panel, Wall St. 
J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 8, col. l. 
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should expand existing doctrines of liability to include the allegedly 
wrongful behavior of the defendants, the directors' investigation and 
decision will probably only consider existing law. Directors certainly 
cannot be expected to expand the scope of directors' (and thus their 
own) fiduciary duties. It also seems unreasonable to measure the direc-
tors' decision solely against the standard of good faith when the deci-
sion of a trial judge is subject to a much tougher standard of appellate 
review. 
A useful analogy can be drawn from the treatment of "interested 
transactions" between a corporation and one or more of its officers or 
directors. The prevailing view is that even where such a transaction is 
approved by a majority of disinterested directors the court will subject 
the transaction "to rigid and careful scrutiny, and [will] invalidate the 
contract if it [is] found to be unfair to the corporation." 127 Even where 
the statutory language read literally suggests that approval by a major-
ity of disinterested directors or shareholders is sufficient by itself, courts 
and commentators have insisted that the court review the transaction 
for faimess. 128 This approach reflects a sage recognition that directors 
are placed in an awkward position when asked to pass on the fairness 
127 Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict o/ Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 
35, 43 (1966). See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (rigorous scrutiny of director's claim 
against bankrupt corporation); Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 854, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 
406-07 (1965); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chern. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (1952); 
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 282-83, 166 N.E.2d 793, 799-801 (1960); 
Abeles v. Adams Eng'r Co., 35 N.J. 411,428-29, 173 A.2d 246,255 (1961); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 
293 N.Y. 442, 460-61, 57 N.E.2d 825, 834 (1944) (court reviewed transaction for fairness even 
though the directors' "good faith is established"); La Vin v. La Vin, 283 A.D. 809, 810, 128 
N.Y.S.2d 518, 519, tifl'd per curiam, 307 N.Y. 790, 121 N.E.2d 620 (1954); H. HENN, supra note I, 
§ 238, at 467; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 80, at 291. A few states still adhere to the old view that 
such a transaction is voidable even if fair and approved by a majority of disinterested directors. 
Cathedral'Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1955) (applying Connecti-
cut law); Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 833, 29 So. 2d 653, 655 (1947); H. HENN, supra note 
I,§ 238, at 466 & n.4; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 80, at 291 n.67. On the other hand, a few cases 
require plaintiff to show not only unfairness but also fraud or bad faith. R HENN, supra note I, 
§ 238, at 466 & n.5. The transaction will receive especially careful scrutiny if the intere~ted direc-
tors have substantial influence with the corporation. See note 149 infra. 
128 Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974); Kennerson v. Burbank 
Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d !57, 170, 260 P.2d 823, 831-32 (1953); Remillard Brick Co. v. 
Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 
36! A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976); H. HENN, supra note I,§ 238, at 468 n.IO & 469; N. LATTIN, supra 
note 3, § 80, at 292; Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Some Aspects qfthe New Jersey, New York 
and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 627-28 (1969); Comment, "Interested Director's" 
Contracts-Section 713 o/ the New York Business Corporation Law and the "Fairness" Test, 41 
FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 648 (1973), and authorities cited therein;.,J6 BUFFALO L. REV. 840, 841-43 
(1967), and authorities cited therein. See also Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 494-95 (3d Cir. 
1976) (under Delaware law, intrinsic fairness test applied where defendants controlled corpora-
tion); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 278 N.E.2d 642, 646, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 437 
(1972) (dictum). q: Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693,695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (business judgment rule 
applied where defendants did not control corporation). 
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of transactions from which their colleagues stand to profit, and that the 
courts must be prepared to step in and protect shareholders from unfair 
transactions. 129 The director who must decide whether to sue his col-
leagues is placed in an even more awkward position. In such cases the 
courts should be even quicker to intervene to defend shareholders by 
subjecting the alleged wrongs to "rigid and careful scrutiny." In sum 
e~~n where the nonimplicated directors and th~ir coun_sel are genuinely 
dlSlnterested, there are strong reasons for findmg a duectors' decision 
to oppose a derivative suit inadequate to justify dismissal of the suit. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the board should never be able 
to terminate a derivative suit against a majority of its members. One 
could argue alternatively that, in such a case, a court should conduct a 
preliminary hearing and, after weighing all relevant factors, 130 decide 
whether continuation of the derivative suit will serve the interests of the 
corporation and of justice. On balance, however, this approach seems 
unwise. Such a hearing would add to the expense and delay of the suit. 
Moreover, the independence of the noninteiested directors and their 
counsel-a key issue in any such hearing-· is exceedingly difficult to 
prove or to disprove. 131 Finally, termination of shareholder litigation 
at the behest of a minority of directors, even after a court hearing, 
would fuel cynicism among stockholders and the general public.m 
One could overlook these problems if there were a substantial 
probability that the hearing would terminate the suit. There is little 
likelihood, however, that minority directors could demonstrate the high 
degree of independence and care that would merit dismissal of the suit. 
Accordingly, a per se rule that bars a minority of board members from 
terminating suits against a majority of directors is preferable. · 
Suits Implicating a Minority of Directors 
Although the board should never be able to terminate a derivative 
suit against a majority of its members, it should be able to terminate a 
129 See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 606 (1875) ("[T]he remaining 
directors are placed in the embarrassing and invidious position of having to pass upon, scrutinize 
and check the transactions and accounts of one of their own body, with whom they are associated 
on terms of equality.in the general management of all the affairs of the corporation."); Munson v. 
Syracuse, G. & C. Ry .• !03 N.Y. 53, 74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886) ("The law cannot accurately 
measure the influence of a trustee with his associates, nor will it enter into the inquiry .... "); 
Marsh, supra note 127, at 37-38. Cf Greene v. Allen, 35 Del. Ch. 242, 249, 114 A.2d 916, 920 
(1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Sup. 
Ct. 1956) (court barred insider from seizing a business opportunity that the corporation had re-
jected because of difficulty of determining whether insider had influenced board to reject that 
opportunity). 
130 See text accompanying notes 136-91 ilifra, proposing such an approach for suits against a 
minority of the directors. 
13 I See note I 04 supra. 
132 See note 243 i'!fra. 
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suit against a minority of directors or nondirector officers in some 
cases. The pressures on nonimplicated directors are not always as great 
in the latter cases, and certain factors may weigh in favor of termina-
tion. 
One major factor weighing in favor of termination of the deriva-
tive suit is the harm the corporation may suffer from litigation ostensi-
bly brought on its behalf. Although the corporation usually is not an 
active participant in shareholder litigation, it may incur substantial 
costs in complying with demands for documents and depositions. 
Moreover, the litigation may divert the attention of management and 
undermine the morale of corporate personnel. 133 Even if the derivative 
suit produces a recovery for the corporation, it may be outweighed by 
these costs. These considerations suggest that in some cases the court 
should be able to curtail derivative suits because they are not in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
The pressures against the independence of nonimplicated directors 
may be much weaker in some cases than in others. Consider, for pur-
poses of illustration, a continuum of situations generating different de-
grees of pressure. At one end would be a suit for self-dealing against 
all directors, including the senior officers and controlling stockholders 
of the company, where the accused board selects two lower corporate 
officers as new members and places them on a committee to determine 
whether the suit should proceed. At the other end of the continuum 
would be a derivative suit against a single lower level officer and direc-
tor for acting beyond the scope of his authority. In the first situation, 
the argument against allowing the committee to terminate the suit is 
overwhelming. In the second situation, however, a court might well 
give serious credence to the board's conclusion that the suit was not in 
the best interests of the corporation. 
A line is needed to distinguish cases warranting a per se treatment 
from those in which board action may warrant dismissal. Although 
any line drawn for this purpose must be somewhat arbitrary, drawing 
the line between suits against a majority of directors and suits against a 
minority has much to recommend it. A majority can select a committee 
of members deemed likely to reach a favorable result, dissolve or over-
rule the committee, and threaten not to renominate directors who will 
not cooperate. A minority of directors may be unable to do any of 
these things. 134 Fear of publicity adverse to the corporation may weigh 
133 See notes 162-64, 203-05, & 232-36 and accompanying text infra. 
134 In the large public corporation a majority of the board can usually control the future com-
position of the board by controlling the proxy machinery. See W. CARY, supra note I, at 229-31. 
It has been suggested that control lies or could lie with the nominating committee. See Coffee, 
supra note 83, at 1232-34. Generally, though, statutes permit the full board to dissolve or overrule 
a committee. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra. Also, the nominating committee 
often bows to the wishes of the chief executive officer. See notes 90-92 supra. 
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less heavily on the nonimplicated directors when a smaller number of 
directors is involved in the suit. Outside counsel will have less reason 
to curry favor with or be intimidated by the alleged wrongdoers if they 
are only a minority of the board. Termination of a derivative suit is 
more likely to be accepted as fair by shareholders and the general pub-
lic if effected by a noninterested majority of the board. Moreover 
courts have long drawn a line at this point with respect to both th~ 
effect of a refusal to sue and the necessity of a demand on the board.IJs 
Finally, distinguishing between suits against a majority and suits 
against a minority of the board creates a bright-line test that facilitates 
the planning of the parties and better avoids lengthy and costly prelimi-
nary skirmishing than a less easily applied test, such as one based on 
whether the alleged wrongdoers dominate the board or the corpora-
tion.136 
A Weighing-if-Factors Approach.-Although the dangers of bias 
are less when only a minority of directors or nondirector officers are 
named in a derivative suit, there are still substantial pressures placed 
on the nonimplicated directors and their special counsel, and there is 
good reason to question whether the investigation by the nonimplicated 
directors is adequate to justify dismissal of the derivative suit. Rather 
than apply a per se rule that, without any inquiry, either dismisses the 
derivative suit or allows it to proceed, the court should conduct a care-
ful inquiry and dismiss the suit only if it is persuaded, after plaintiff has 
had sufficient opportunity to develop his case, that the nonimplicated 
directors are reasonably independent, have conducted an adequate in-
vestigation, and have articulated cogent reasons why the derivative suit 
should not proceed. 
Independence .-Although the courts recognize that directors must 
be independent of the alleged wrongdoers if their refusal to sue is to 
thwart a derivative suit, 137 the courts often have assumed that the direc-
tors are independent unless plaintiff presents clear evidence of bias. 138 
As previously discussed, this assumption is unwarranted. 139 How then 
135 See notes 18, 19, & 31 supra. 
136 See notes 147-49 and accompanying text infra. 
137 See note 31 supra. 
138 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979) (" 'disinterest' is defined as lack 
of any financial stake ... in the transaction"); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966) 
(domination of board not sufficiently pleaded by allegations that alleged wrongdoer was the cor-
poration's largest shareholder, owning more than 12% of its stock, and had three of its employees 
on the corporation's 17-member board); Coffee, supra note 83, at 1229-30. In cases involving 
special litigation committees, several courts have adopted narrow concepts of what constitutes a 
lack of independence, see note 67 supra, and seem to have placed the burden of proof as to 
independence on the plaintiff, see note 184 i'!fra. 
139 See text accompanying notes 80-112 supra. 
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should a court determine in a particular case whether nonimplicated 
directors are reasonably independent? 
To be considered independent, a director must not be named as a 
defendant in the derivative suit or implicated in the alleged wrong. 
These are the minimum requisites of independence. A court may also 
consider whether each director's past performance on corporate boards 
has shown evidence of real independence. Evidence that a director 
who opposed suing a fellow director had often voted against that direc-
tor on other matters would support a claim of independence. On the 
other hand, where a director has no history of opposing fellow direc-
tors, even on matters where their personal finances were not at stake, 
some courts have held it unrealistic to expect him to act independently 
in a matter that might result in serious liability for his fellow direc-
tors.l4o 
Although outside as well as inside directors are subject to pres-
sures on their independence, the pressures on inside directors are 
greater, 141 and courts should be especially skeptical of their claims of 
independence. Even directors who are not corporate officers, and thus 
not inside directors, may be so closely connected to management that 
their independence should be doubted. Family ties, business or profes-
sional dealings with the corporation, 142 or a web of interlocking direc-
torates143 can seriously compromise a director's independence. It has 
been suggested that such directors be deemed "affiliated." 144 Courts 
140 De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other 
grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (lOth Cir. 1970). See also Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 8 
A.D.2d 310, 316-17, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 71-72 (1959) (board found not independent where it was 
advised by officer of dominant shareholder and "[h]is advice was uniformly followed"), ajfd, 8 
N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960). It might be argued that it is unreasonable 
to ask whether a director has dissented on prior board votes because nearly all board resolutions 
are adopted unanimously. This argument, however, only tends to underscore the lack of indepen-
dence of most directors. 
14 1 See notes 80-96 and accompanying text supra. 142 
"Family ties, business or other professional arrangements may not disqualify one from 
serving as a director, but such an individual cannot be held out as an 'outside director.' " Report 
of the Fifty-Second American Assembly, The Ethics of Corporate Conduct 5 (Harriman, N.Y.) 
(Apr. 14-17, 1977). See also Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 1830-31. It is not unusual for a 
board to include relatives of officers, retired executives of the corporation, outside counsel for the 
corporation, or investment bankers, commercial bankers, or suppliers who do business with the. 
corporation. See note 87 supra. But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(partner for corporation's regular outside counsel held a legally disinterested director as to trans-
action in which he had no direct financial interest). 
143 See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 80, at 183 I. 
144 Professors Weiss and Schwartz would label a director "affiliated" if he has recently engaged 
in or proposes to engage in material transactions with the corporation, if he has close family ties 
With a corporate officer, or if any officer of the corporation sits on the board of a corporation of 
Which the director is an officer. Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 83, at 20. The SEC dropped a 
proposed amendment of Schedule 14A that would have required labeling many such directors as 
"affiliated non-management," but, in a note to Item 6(b) of the Schedule, stated that any attempt 
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should be equally skeptical regarding claims of independence by b t 
affiliated directors and inside directors. 0 
If a committee is established to investigate charges against dire 
tors, it should be composed exclusively of nonaffiliated, nonimplicat c 
directors, 145 and should, if possible, be selected solely by nonaffiliate~ 
nonimplicated directors so as to reduce the possibility that the accuse 
directors will fi~l the committee with directors from whom they expe~; 
the greatest leruency.I46 
Nonimplicated directors' claims of independence should also be 
greeted with skepticism where the derivative suit names dominant 
stockholders or officers as defendants. In such cases, a majority of the 
board may feel no more free to act independently than would a minor-
ity in a suit against a majority of the board. 147 Such cases should there-
fore be treated like suits against a majority of the board. One problem 
with this is that it is often difficult to identify the controlling persons of 
large corporations. 148 The percentage of stock owned is not always de-
terminative of working control, for in a widely held company the 
holder of even a small percentage may have effective control. 149 Fur-
thermore, in many cases control is not absolutely lodged in a single 
person, institution, or cohesive group, but is divided among several. If 
the defendants in a derivative suit own a substantial amount of stock, 
the court should seek other indicia of control. Although no easy, fool-
proof formula is available for determining control, numerous statutes 
and common law doctrines address the concept of corporate control, 
and the factors weighed by courts and administrative agencies in other 
matters involving determinations of corporate control should be useful 
by the issuer to label such directors "independent" might be materially misleading. See Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,766. 
145 The reported opinions involving litigation committees generally have not indicated whether 
the committees have included inside directors. Although most probably have been composed 
solely of outside directors, in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), one commit-
tee member was a senior vice president of Exxon. /d. at 510 n.2. 
146 It does not appear in the cases involving litigation committees that the accused directors 
have recused themselves from the selection of the committee. 
147 The courts have recognized this by holding that a demand on the board is unnecessary and 
that the board's refusal to sue will not thwart a derivative suit if the defendants, though not com-
prising a majority of the board, otherwise dominate the board or the corporation. See note 19 
supra. 
148 W. CARY, supra note I, at 230. 
149 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (rev. ed. 
1967); 2 L. Loss, supra note 50, at 770. Courts have also held that a transaction between a corpo-
ration and a director must be scrutinized more carefully if the director has substantial influence 
with the corporation. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489-91, 121 N.E. 
378, 379-80 (1918) (Cardozo, J.). See Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 8 A.D.2d 
310, 317, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 72 (1959), ajf'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 
(1960). 
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in derivative suits as well. 150 The factors considered should include the 
amount of stock held by the persons in question, the number of their 
representatives on the board, their demonstrated influence, the corpo-
rate offices they hold, and their strategic position on executive and 
nominating committees. 151 Power to direct the corporate proxy ma-
chinery should suffice to show control, but lack of such power should 
not necessarily prove an absence of control. 152 
Even if the defendants do not do1r..inate or control the corporation 
they may be able to influence the board if they are high-level officers, 
integral members of the management team. Such influence is espe-
cially likely when the board is composed largely of the defendants' fel-
low officers. If corporations adopt the suggestions of some 
commentators that insiders be virtually eliminated from the board, 153 
perhaps it will become unnecessary to assume some influence by insid-
. ers over the board, but until such time a court should consider such 
influence a strong possibility. 
Only if the foregoing factors point strongly toward the indepen-
dence of those directors who have decided not to sue should the court 
consider dismissing the derivative suit. Because bias is so difficult to 
prove or disprove, the inquiry will be a difficult one. Nevertheless, the 
inquiry is inescapable unless a per se rule is to govern all such cases. 
In investigating charges brought in a derivative suit, the nonimpli-
cated directors will usually require the assistance of counsel. 154 Al-
though it is doubtful whether any counsel paid by the corporation can 
be truly disinterested, 155 certain steps can be taken to assure some de-
gree of independence. First, counsel should not be the corporation's 
~ouse counsel or regular outside counsel: both have close and continu-
mg ties with management that would subvert their independence. 156 
Second, to help ensure that counsel does not favor defendants in order 
to curry favor with management in the hope of receiving future busi-
ness from the corporation, it should be agreed that counsel will not be 
ret~ined again by the corporation for some substantial period of time. 
Thrrd, to help ensure that counsel neither has nor tries to develop a 
reputation for leniency in such cases among other potential corporate 
15
° For example, the concept of control plays a key role in the statutes administered by the 
Securities and Exchange Co=ission. 2 L. Loss, supra note 50, at 764-70. 
151 /d. at 778-83. · 
152 /d. at 779. 
153 For example, SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams has suggested that the chief executive 
officer should be the only inside director on the board. Speech by Harold Williams to the Ameri-
c~ Assembly IS (Columbia University, Apr. 16, I977). Accord, C. BROWN, supra note 83, at 33. 
1
54 See note II4 and accompanying text supra. 
1
55 See text accompanying notes I 13-I5 supra. 
~6 For this reason courts have often insisted that the corporation appear by independent coun-
sel mad· · · "' · 02 envahve smt. ... ee text accompanymg note I supra. 
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clients, 157 it would be preferable to retain a reputable firm that often 
represents plaintiffs as well as defendants in derivative suits. Such 
counsel would be less concerned about its reputation among corpora-
tions and also more experienced in conducting the kind of aggressive 
inquiry that would be desirable. Finally, if special counsel is to be se-
lected after a derivative suit has commenced, the nonimplicated direc-
tors should consult with plaintiffs as to the selection of counsel. 
Adequacy of the Investigation.-It would make a mockery of jus-
tice if supposedly disinterested directors could terminate a derivative 
suit after a sham investigation of the alleged wrongdoing. Clearly, a 
court. must determine whether directors have conducted an adequate 
investigation. 
To be consistent with the business judgment rule, the investigation 
must at least have been conducted with due care, that is, with the care 
and skill that a reasonably prudent and competent person would exer-
cise under similar circumstances. 158 The business judgment rule, how-
ever, is intended to apply to suits seeking to hold the directors liable for 
injury to the corporation, and perhaps to suits to compel or enjoin cer-
tain acts by the directors; the rule need not be applied to cases dealing 
with the effect of a refusal to sue on a derivative suit. 159 Such cases 
demand a more stringent standard. Since the purpose of the derivative 
suit is to vindicate the rights of the corporation and, indirectly, of the 
shareholders, the court should permit the suit to proceed at least to the 
discovery stage if the directors failed to pursue any line o.f inquiry that 
probably would have led to material evidence incriminating the de-
fendants. Any lesser standard would free the way for inadequate inves-
tigations and leave the corporation and its shareholders without 
remedy for a probable injury. Such a result cannot be justified by the 
policy underlying the business judgment rule-the absolution of direc-
tors from liability for mere errors of judgment--or by any other sound 
policy. 
Failure to pursue a line of inquiry does not necessarily intimate 
any fault or negligence on the part of directors or their counsel. For 
example, the directors' efforts may be frustrated by inability to compel 
the submission of evidence or to threaten punishment for perjury. If a 
due care standard were followed, an investigation could be deemed ad-
equate despite the inability of the directors to compel submission of 
crucial evidence. The prospect of such a result argues further for the 
application of a more stringent test. 
A standard requiring the directors to have pursued every probably 
material line of inquiry is somewhat vague, but no more so than other 
157 See note 115 and accompanying text supra. 
158 See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
159 See text accompanying notes 192-95 i'!fra. 
128 
75:96 (1980) Shareholder Litigation 
standards applied by the courts or than a due care standard under the 
business judgment rule. More difficult than the vagueness problem is 
the problem of how the plaintiff can show that the investigation has 
overlooked a promising line of inquiry. This problem will be discussed 
below.160 
Cogency if the Explanation.-One crucial issue is to what extent a 
court should review the reasons given by nonimplicated directors for 
opposing a derivative suit. Reasons tending to support a decision not 
to sue do not necessarily support a decision to oppose a derivative suit. 
For example, in Gall v. Exxon Corp. 161 the reasons cited by the com-
mittee included "the unfavorable prospects for success of the litigation 
[and] the cost of conducting the litigation." 162 Although these might be 
persuasive reasons for declining to sue, they would not justify opposing 
a derivative suit where the plaintiff-shareholder assumes the cost of liti-
gation and the risk of an unfavorable decision. Similarly, the costs of 
the suit to the corporation should be irrelevant to the extent that the 
plaintiff is required to post security for the corporation's expenses, 163 or 
where the corporation has waived the right to demand such security. 
The directors should be required to describe with particularity the 
facts and assumptions underlying each reason for their decision to op-
pose the derivative suit. For example, a claim that the suit would inter-
rupt corporate business affairs or undermine personnel morale 164 
should not be taken at face value as sufficient grounds for stopping a 
derivative suit: lawsuits always interrupt the affairs of the parties and 
undermine the morale of those threatened with liability. The directors 
should be required to show that the interruption of business and the 
undermining of morale would be substantially greater than that which 
ordinarily attends involvement in litigation, and great enough to harm 
substantially the business of the corporation. The court should realize 
~hat large corporations are continually embroiled in litigation and that 
m most instances the costs of involvement in even a major suit are in-
significant in comparison to the corporation's assets and revenues. In 
160 See text accompanying notes 175-83 infra. 161 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 162 /d. at 514 n.l3. See also Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 
822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 626,393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 
920, 923 ( 1979). 163 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 627 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See generally H. HENN, 
supra note I, § 372. The expenses for which security must be posted include the expenses of other 
defendants indemnifiable by the corporation and, generally, include attorneys' fees. Jd. at 782-83 
& n.S. 
_
164 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508,514 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), .where the committee· 
Cited "interruption of corporate business affairs" as one reason for its decision. See also Ga1ef v. 
Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5902 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980), and Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-
3180, slip op. at 20 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (citing adverse effects on employee morale). 
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general, since there can be no precise formula to weigh the cogency of 
the reasons for the directors' decision not to sue, a judgment as to the 
adequacy of these reasons will rest largely in the discretion of the trial 
judge, and the judge should not hesitate to require more than a cursory 
showing by the board. 
Nature of the Alleged Wrong.-Since courts generally have not 
permitted the vote of a majority of shareholders to ratify a fraudulent 
illegal, or ultra vires act, 165 it should follow that directors, who presum~ 
ably represent the shareholders, should not be permitted to decline to 
sue when the corporation is injured by such an act, for a refusal to sue 
has the same effect as a ratification: to shelter the act from judicial 
scrutiny. 166 The courts usually have held, however, that a refusal to sue 
does not amount to a ratification. 167 Nonetheless, it might be appropri-
ate for the courts to consider the nature of the wrong in deciding 
whether the board should be able to thwart a derivative suit against a 
minority of the directors. Courts should be more reluctant to dismiss 
complaints of wrongs that would be nonratifiable. 168 Perhaps more im-
portant, courts should be more reluctant to dismiss claims alleging self-
dealing or some other breach of the duty of loyalty than to dismiss 
other kinds of claims. 
The alleged wrongs in many of the recently decided cases involv-
ing litigation committees have concerned questionable payments,l69 in 
165 Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 315-17 (3d Cir. 1962). See Mayer v. Adams, 37 
Del. Ch. 298, 303-05, 141 A.2d 458, 461-62 ( 1958). See generally H. HENN, supra note 1, § 194; 
Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited Judicial Re-
view, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1086 (1963); HARVARD Note, supra note 17, at 762; Comment, Share-
holder Validation of Directors' Frauds: The Non-ratification Rule v. the Business Judgment Rule, 58 
Nw. U.L. REV. 807 (1964). 
166 See Coffee, supra note 83, at 1222-23. 
167 Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 
418 F. Supp. 508, 517-18 & n.l8 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judgment granted for defendants}, 
rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Findley v. 
Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 177, 240 P.2d 421, 428 (1952); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. 
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 110-11, 93 N.E.2d 241, 247 (1956). But see 
Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 303-04, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (1958); Syracuse Television, Inc. v. 
Channel9 Syracuse, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 246, 275 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 638, 
280 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1967). 
168 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980) (no termination by board 
where suit alleges self-dealing). But see Seigal v. Merrick, No. 74-2475, slip op. at 11, 17-18 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (application of the business judgment rule does not depend on the nature 
of the alleged offense). 
169 Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 
(1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. 
Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 
994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [Current Binder] SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Mar. 26, 1980) (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. II, 1980); Wechsler v. Exxon Corp .. 
55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d Ill (1977); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 
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many cases made exclusively in foreign countries. 170 Defendants have 
usually argued successfully that such payments, even if unethical, vio-
lated no foreign or American laws. 171 At the very least the courts in 
these cases may have been reluctant to hold defendants liable for acts 
that, when performed, were widely accepted in the business community 
and from which the defendants realized no personal gain, especially 
since the corporations in question had taken steps to prevent the recur-
rence of questionable payments. 172 The unpopularity of recent federal 
legislation proscribing such payments173 and doubt as to the wisdom of 
attacking questionable payments by means of derivative suits 174 may 
have been unarticulated reasons for judicial hostility to these suits. 
When more serious wrongs are alleged, however, courts should con-
sider distinguishing dismissals of suits alleging nothing more serious 
than questionable payments. 
The Stage o/ the Derivative Suzi'.-Several of the factors discussed 
above, including the independence of the nonimplicated directors and 
of special counsel, the adequacy of the investigation, and the reasons 
for the refusal to sue, entail issues of fact. The plaintiff, who often must 
commence his suit with little information, will not possess the relevant 
facts at the outset. Indeed, most of the relevant information will be in 
the hands of the defendants and of the corporation which, by hypothe-
sis, opposes the suit. To what extent should plaintiff be entitled to dis-
covery or a trial before the court decides a motion to dismiss based on 
the corporation's refusal to sue? The cases are hopelessly inconsistent 
on this question, with some courts permitting full trials, some full dis-
covery, some limited discovery, and some no discovery. 175 • 
6 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Levy 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1977). For a description of 
Gall v. Exxon Corp. see notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra. 
The term "questionable payments" encompasses bribes, kickbacks, illegal political contribu-
tions, and sometimes legal political contributions as well. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & 
Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 819 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
170 See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
171 fd. at 518-19. 
172 See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (court held that committee properly considered that suit served no deterrent purpose be-
cause of corrective steps already taken). 
173 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 forbids such payments even in foreign countries. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. II 1978). This legislation has been condemned by many com-
mentators. See Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Reform, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
3, 12 n.3 (1977). The Carter Administration has also shown interest in limiting it. See Taubman, 
Carter Unit Recommends Easing o/ Bribery Law, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1979, at DI, col. I. 
174 Even if such questionable payments should be illegal, derivative suits against those who 
make such payments may not be the best method of dealing with them. For one thing, the pay-
mentsdo not benefit those who make them, but are intended to benefit the corporation and proba-
bly often do so. See Coffee, supra note 83, at I 105-06. 
175 See notes 40-42 & 66 supra. 
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If the relevant test is whether the directors who refused to sue are 
not implicated in the suit and have conducted a reasonable investiga-
tion, little discovery by the plaintiff should be necessary. The plaintiff 
should be able to establish by simple depositions or interrogatories 
whether the directors have any connection with the suit, and the record 
of the investigation itself should indicate whether the directors con-
ducted more than a sham investigation. If a court applies the business 
judgment rule, however, more substantial discovery-perhaps full dis-
covery on all relevant issues-is appropriate, since it cannot be deter-
mined whether the nonimplicated directors have acted with due loyalty 
and care without some inquiry into the merits of the case. If the ulti-
mate question is whether the nonimplicated directors have adequately 
protected the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, the 
plaintiff-sharehoider generally should be permitted to conduct thor-
ough discovery before the court will entertain a motion for summary 
judgment. Until the plaintiff has conducted such discovery it cannot be 
ascertained whether the directors have ferreted out all significant evi-
dence of wrongdoing and whether there is factual support for the direc-
tors' decision not to sue. 
To permit the plaintiff full discovery, however, may defeat the cor-
poration's purpose in opposing the suit. Even if dismissal is granted 
after discovery and before trial, the corporation may suffer significant 
costs, disruption, and personnel morale problems attendant upon litiga-
tion during discovery. Nonetheless, to allow the plaintiff full discovery 
is the preferable approach. Many courts have held that summary judg-
ment should rarely be granted against the plaintiff in a derivative suit 
before he 'has had an opportunity for discovery. 176 To follow the ap-
proach in Gall v. Exxon Corp. 177 of allowing plaintiff's discovery only 
for purposes of ascertaining the good faith and independence (appar-
ently narrowly defined) of the litigation co~ittee members may deny 
the corporation and its sharehplders a remedy where the directors have 
not conducted a reasonably chreful investigation.· Even a reasonable 
care standard can leave the corporation remediless where evidence in-
criminating the defendants goes undetected because of limitations 
placed on the plaintiff's discovery. Such results cannot be counte-
nanced. 
If the directors' investigation has been conducted with reasonable 
skill, the additional costs, disruption, and personnel morale problems 
of the corporation resulting from plaintiff's discovery should not be ex-
cessive. Parties are limited to the discovery of relevant, nonprivileged 
matter, 178 and protective orders 179 can prevent the plaintiff from need-
176 See Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cerl. denied, 395 
U.S. 906 (1969), and authorities cited therein. 
177 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). . 
178 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 6.3, at 180. Ordt-
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lessly plowing the same ground already tilled by the nonimplicated di-
rectors.180 Thus, plaintiff's discovery can and should be limited to 
relevant matter overlooked by the nonimplicated directors. The bur-
den of this additional discovery should not be unreasonable in light of 
the benefits of derivative suits181 and of the cynicism that would be 
bred if plaintiffs were not permitted to delve into charges of serious 
wrongs by corporate directors. 182 
Once discovery has been completed, a hearing will usually be nec-
essary to resolve questions of fact. It has been suggested that a separate 
trial be held on the corporation's motion to dismiss based on the direc-
tors' refusal to sue. 183 On occasion such a separate trial may save the 
court and the parties time, trouble, and money, but in general it proba-
bly will not. To determine whether the nonimplicated directors are 
completely independent of the defendants and have conducted a thor-
ough investigation exploring all probably fruitful lines of inquiry, it 
will be necessary to delve deeply into the same kinds of questions that 
constitute the merits of the case. To hold a separate trial as to the effect 
of the refusal to sue might save little time or money and would often 
waste much of both. 
Burdens o.f Proo.f.-The courts have not paid much attention to the 
issue of who bears the burden of proof on such questions as the inde-
pendence of the directors and the adequacy of their investigation, but 
they sometimes seem to imply that the plaintiff bears this burden. 184 
The courts often state that the directors are assumed to have acted in 
good faith and with due care. 185 Perhaps this assumption is justified 
when directors are sued for a breach of duty; otherwise, a plaintiff 
narily, documents produced in the directors' investigation would be discoverable. Any assertion 
of a privilege to prevent such discovery should be deemed highly prejudicial to the corporation's 
motion to dismiss. 
179 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 116, § 6.13, at 206-07. If the 
reluctance of courts to protect corporations from excessive, vexatious discovery in derivative suits 
makes such suits unreasonably expensive, reform efforts should deal directly with this reluctance 
rather than attempting t'o empower the directors, who cannot be completely disinterested, to ter-
minate the suit. 
180 Since the directors' investigation will not have been conducted under oath", it would be 
necessary to have witnesses swear to the accuracy of statements made to the directors. 
t8 l See note 3 supra. 
182 See text accompanying notes 241-44 infta. 183 CHICAGO Comment, supra note 17, at 198-200. 184 See Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other graunds, 567 
F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., No. 75-3682, slip op. at 
4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1977) (plaintiff must show directors' lack of independence); Falkenberg v. 
Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff has burden of showing bad 
faith, fraud, or improper investigation). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800, slip op. at 24 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 18, l980).(dictum) (defendants have burden of proving independence). 185 See Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 {Del. 1960); ·E. FoLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW 76 {1972). 
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could by bare allegations cast upon the directors the burden of provin 
the propriety of each of their acts. Where the issue is the soundness ~1 
a decision not to sue, however, all relevant considerations suggest that 
the corporation should bear the burden of proof. First, the burden of 
proof is often placed on the party having better access to the relevant 
facts, 186 and the nonimplicated directors have access to the information 
relevant to proof of their independence, the independence of their spe-
cial counsel, and the adequacy of their investigation. Second, the cor-
poration has the burden of pleading the directors' refusal to sue as a 
defense and therefore usually would have the burden of proving that 
defense. 187 Third, the burden should be placed on the corporation as 
the party contending "that the more unusual event has occurred,"l88 
for, in light of the numerous studies showing the pressures on directors 
to conform and the general lack of independence among directors, 189 it 
would be more unusual for the directors to be genuinely independent 
and to conduct a rigorous investigation than for the contrary to be true. 
Furthermore, the corporation has much greater resources than the 
plaintiff and thus can bear the burden more easily. Finally, since the 
question regarding the effect of the refusal to sue is only whether to 
dismiss or to permit plaintiff to proceed to a determination of the mer-
its-a determination as to which the plaintiff ordinarily bears the bur-
den of proofl90-it seems appropriate to cast the burden of proof on the 
corporation as movant so as to favor a full hearing on the merits.l91 
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED STANDARDS 
A number of criticisms may be leveled at the standards proposed 
186 See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 337, at 787 (2d ed. E. Cleary 
1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940). 
187 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, at 785. q. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(c) (requiring defen!fant 
to plead affirmative defenses). But see Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(district court treated refusal to sue as raising not an affirmative defense but, rather, the issue of 
plaintiffs standing to sue), rev'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 
1831 (1979). q. Lewis v. Anderson, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,153 (9th Cir. 1979) (also 
treating refusal as raising issue of standing, but for purpose of right to jury trial). 
188 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 787. 
189 See notes 80-93 and accompanying text supra. 
190 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 786 (burden of proof usually is allocated lo 
the plaintiff, who seeks to change the status quo). q. H. HENN, supra note I,§ 234, at 457 & n.30 
(burden is ordinarily on plaintiff to prove breach of duty of due care). Yet, the burden often has 
been placed on defendants to prove the fairness of interested transactions. See, e.g., Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 
(1921); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (!955); 
notes 127-29 supra. 
191 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 186, § 337, at 786, 789 (burden of proof is sometimes allo-
cated to party making "a disfavored contention" or a disfavored defense). Because dismissal de-
prives plaintiff and the shareholders of a hearing on the merits, a defense based on the directors' 
refusal to sue could be deemed a disfavored defense. 
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above for determining the effect of the board's refusal to sue. Although 
some of these criticisms are well-founded, none is persuasive . 
.Disregard of the Business Judgment Rule 
It may be argued that the decision whether it is in the best interests 
of the corporation to sue should be the province of those charged with 
managing the corporation, namely, the board of directors. It may be 
further argued that if such a decision is made in accordance with the 
business judgment rule, that is, in good faith and with due care, that 
decision should be. conclusive. This argument ignores the purpose of 
the business judgment rule, which is not to ensure a correct result, but 
to insulate from liability directors who have made mistaken decisions 
resulting in corporate losses, notwithstanding their good faith and exer-
cise of due care. Because the plaintiff in the derivative suit does not 
seek to impose liability on the directors for their decision not to sue, the 
business judgment rule is largely irrelevant in evaluating the directors' 
decision. 192 Moreover, even to the extent that the business judgment 
rule is relevant, experience shows that courts tend to misuse the rule in 
derivative suits involving refusals to sue by applying it without suffi-
cient inquiry. 193 This is reason enough to be skeptical of the utility of 
the business judgment rule in this area. 
The criticism that the proposed approach wrongfully disregards 
the business judgment rule may be placed in a more useful perspective, 
however, by considering the public policy underlying the rule and the 
public policy implications of permitting directors to stop a derivative 
suit. There are numerous salutary policy reasons for the rule. First, the 
directors are hired to manage the corporation to the best of their abil-
ity, not to insure the success of the corporation, and it would be unfair 
to treat them as insurers. Second, if directors were held liable for rea-
sonable decisions that proved unsuccessful, competent persons would 
either refuse to be directors or would become inordinately cautious in 
managing the corporation so as to reduce the prospects of liability. 
Third, the rule leaves governance of the corporation primarily to the 
directors selected by the shareholders who own the corporation rather 
than to a judge not selected by them. Finally, the rule promotes judi-
cial economy by relieving the courts from involvement in complicated 
business questions, unless the directors have breached a duty to the 
corporation. 194 These policy reasons, however, do not generally war-
192 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
193 See note 28 supra. 
194 See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582F. 2d 259,274-75 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S: 1129 (1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions). Cf. Note, The Con-
tinuing Viability o/ the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 562, 565-66 (1967) (linking the rule historically to the doctrine of laissez-faire). 
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rant dismissing a derivative suit on the basis of the directors' refusal to 
sue, even when made with good faith and due care. Allowing the de-
rivative suit to proceed despite the directors' opposition does not make 
insurers of the directors, causing them to resign or become unduly cau-
tious, because the derivative suit does not threaten them with liability 
for refusing to sue. It also does not divide management and the board 
of directors because the corporation remains officially opposed to the 
suit. 195 Last, it does not involve the courts in questions of business pol-
icy, as opposed to questions of wrongs to the corporation, because the 
corporation's policy remains undisturbed. 
Even if permitting a derivative suit could be viewed as somehow 
infringing. the principle of management by the directors, dismissing a 
meritorious derivative suit would seriously infringe the principle of po-
licing observance of the directors' co1 porate duties. This latter princi-
ple should be deemed more important because, without it, the directors 
would be subject to no checks. In short, the business judgment rule is 
either entirely consistent with the standards proposed herein or should 
give way to the policies underlying those standards. 
The "Rudderless" Corporation Objection 
It has been objected that if nonimplicated directors cannot halt a 
suit against a majority of the directors, then, in such situations, the cor-
poration is left "rudderless," powerless to act on an important issue.196 
This objection is largely specious. Within the proposed standards the 
corporation retains the power to investigate alleged wrongs, to decide 
whether to sue thereon, to join as a plaintiff and perhaps supersede the 
derivative plaintiff if it does decide to sue, 197 to settle the dispute with 
the true defendants, 198 to defend the suit actively if its interests are 
195 See text accompanying notes 196-202 infra. 
196 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip op. at 14a (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,928 (1979) ("To accept the 
assertions of the intervenor and to disqualify the entire board would be to render the corporation 
powerless to make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative 
action."). See also Brief for Appellants Bennett, et al. at 20-21, Reply Brief at 10-11, Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
197 See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1039 (E. D. Pa. 1971); Silverman v. 
Re, 194 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Lazar v. Merchants' Nat'! Properties, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 253, 
254 N.Y.S.2d 712 (!964) (permitting corporation in good faith to take over derivative suit). But 
see Palmer v. Morris, 341 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. !965); Generallnv. Corp. v. Addinsell, 255 A.D. 319, 
7 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1938). See generally Haudek, supra note I, at 773-75. 
198 Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 941 ( !965). The role of court 
approval of such settlements is unclear. In Wolf the court held that court approval was not re· 
qui red by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (now FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 ), but not all courts agree; in any case, a 
court might insist on review of the settlement once it was pleaded as a defense in the derivative 
action. See generally Haudek, The Selllemenl and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part II: 
The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 8!3-16 (1969). 
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threatened, I 99 and to advance the defendants their attorneys' fees pend-
ing disposition of the suit. 200 The only thing the corporation cannot do 
is prevent a court from hearing charges of misconduct against its direc-
tors,. except where a minority of the directors is charged and the court is 
satisfied after a careful weighing of all relevant factors that dismissal is 
appropriate. 
Under the proposed standards, the corporation is no more rud-
derless than it is in a suit challenging interested transactions-transac-
tions between the corporation and its officers or directors. In that 
situation, the courts will scrutinize the transactions for fairness even 
though approved by disinterested directors because of the inevitable 
pressure on disinterested directors to disregard the welfare of the cor-
poration.20I Any costs and uncertainty resulting from a suit attacking 
the interested transaction are thought warranted by the avoidance and 
deterrence of transactions unfair to the corporation. The potential dis-
ruption of corporate planning would seem to be less in allowing deriva-
tive suits despite the directors' opposition than in allowing suits against 
interested transactions. 202 
Exposure to Strike Suits 
Critics have often claimed that derivative suits are subject to abuse 
by unscrupulous attorneys who take advantage of them to bring strike 
suits203-that is, groundless nuisance suits brought not to benefit but to 
extort a settlement from the corporation, which wants to avoid the ex-
pense and disruption of litigation. 204 A related problem has been pri-
vate settlements of both groundless and meritorious derivative suits, 
where the plaintiff may receive much more than the court award of 
attorneys' fees he would have received by going to judgment. The cor-
poration, for whose benefit the suit in theory was brought, not only 
receives nothing, but also often pays the settlement, thus compounding 
the initial wrong and resulting in "double looting."2os 
Beginning in the 1940s, many state legislatures responded to these 
abuses by enacting legislation regulating derivative suits.206 This legis-
I99 See note 102 supra. 
200 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 379, at 803. 20 I See notes 127-29 supra. 
202 A suit challenging an interested transaction roils corporate planning by making it uncertain 
whether the transaction will be voided by the court. Most derivative suits seek damages for past 
acts and thus do not hinder corporate planning. 203 See F. WOOD, N.Y. STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING 
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS 112-15 (1944). 
204 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 358, at 752 n.22; Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The 
Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1934). . 
205 H B 
· ALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS§ 152, at 363 & n.4 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, supra note I, 
§ 374, at 789. 206 See A. CONARD, supra note 6, § 252, at 399-400; Hornstein, supra note 6, at 3-10. 
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lation, however, often seemed to go so far beyond what was necessary 
to curb the alleged abuses as to raise suspicions that its advocates 
wanted to discourage meritorious derivative suits as well as to elimi-
nate the abuses. 207 Professor Hornstein in particular argued persua-
sively that if the abuse was out-of-court settlements benefiting only the 
plaintiffs attorney, the remedy was simply to bar settlements without 
court approval; to burden derivative suits further would serve no legiti-
mate purpose.208 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure209 and most states2 IO now 
require court approval of settlements of derivative suits, thereby 
prohibiting private settlements.211 This requirement also helps to pre-
vent strike suits, since a court would not approve the settlement of a 
groundless suit to the benefit of the plaintiff and the loss of the corpora_ 
tion.212 In a few jurisdictions statutes require the plaintiff to indemnify 
the corporation and the defendants for their expenses if the court finds 
that the action was brought without reasonable cause.213 Thus, the pos-
sible profit from strike suits may be far outweighed by the costs of 
bringing such suits.214 Certainly, the possibility of nuisance suits 
brought for their settlement value would seem to be greater in many 
nonderivative civil suits where plaintiff (and his attorney) keep the en-
tire recovery and do not need court approval of a settlement. More-
over, if the corporation does encounter what it believes to be a 
groundless strike suit, there are many steps it can take to protect it-
207 See note 6 supra. 
208 Hornstein, supra note 6, at 3. 
209 FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 provides that "[t]he action shall not be dismissed or compromised 
without the approval of the court . . .. " 
210 Most states have followed federal rule 23.1. E.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MicH. GEN. CT. R. 
208.5; N.J. C!v. PRAc. R. 4:32-4, -3; N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAW 908 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. Bus. 
CoRP. LAW§ 626(d) (McKinney 1963). For a more complete list, see Haudek, supra note I, at 767 
n.3. See generally H. HENN, supra note I,§ 374. 
211 Moreover, if the plaintiff manages nonetheless to receive a secret settlement or to be bought 
off by the corporation, another shareholder may bring a second derivative action to recover the 
amount received by the plaintiff. See H. HENN, supra note I,§ 374, at 790-91; Haudek, supra note 
198, at 816-19. 
212 For example, a court wiH not approve a dismissal conditioned on defendant's paying a fee 
to plaintiffs attorney but nothing to the corporation. Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 
(S.D.N. Y. 1955). Moreover, if the plaintiff is bought off with funds from the corporate treasury, 
the payment may be recovered from plaintiff for the corporation. Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951). 
213 See H. HENN, supra note I,§ 378. Many state statutes require plaintiffs to post security for 
the expenses of both the corporation and those indemnifiable by it. See note 163 supra. Although 
reimbursement or posting of security for expenses will rarely compensate the corporation for all 
the direct and indirect expenses it incurs, the prospect of such payments should deter frivolous 
derivative suits. 
214 See H. HENN, supra note I, § 374, at 791 ("[T]here remains little opportunity to derive 
personal gain from a derivative action, thus seriously curbing 'strike-suits . . . .' "). 
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self.215 These factors have led some to question whether strike suits 
now exist to any significant degree.21 6 
In practice it still may be possible for a plaintiff to profit from a 
nuisance·-suit, either because state indemnification laws or directors' lia-
bility insurance may make it possible,217 or because a secret settlement 
may go undiscovered.218 The problems of indemnification and liability 
insurance might be remedied by revising relevant state laws.219 To the 
extent that strike suits remain a problem, they should be handled with-
out permitting directors to halt derivative suits, except in accordance 
with the proposals in this article. The directors will tend to oppose 
both meritorious and nonmeritorious suits. Indeed, they may oppose 
meritorious suits more energetically because such suits pose greater 
threats of potential harm and embarrassment to the accused directors. 
It would be preferable to deter strike suits by requiring plaintiffs to pay 
the corporation's and the defendants' attorneys' fees and other expenses 
where the action is found to have been brought without reasonable 
cause,220 by allowing suits for abuse of process against plaintiffs and 
215 See notes 196-200 and accompanying text supra. 
216 See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 
CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 65 (1968) (quoting Abraham Pomerantz, a prominent plaintiffs' 
attorney, as saying that the strike suit is a "false image," an "epithet bereft of reality"). But see rd. 
at 66-68 (stating that abuses of derivative litigation by plaintiffs' attorneys continue). 
217 Some state statutes permit indemnification of directors for costs incurred in settlement of 
derivative suits, although they probably do not include amounts to be paid by the defendants to 
the corporation. See Bishop, supra note 37, at 1082-84. Thus, it may be in the short-term interest 
of the corporation to encourage the defendants to settle and then accept reimbursement for their 
attorneys' fees rather than to force those defendants to engage in protracted litigation, after which 
the corporation may be required to pay a much larger indemnity. In the long run, however, the 
corporation's interests are better served by vigorously opposing and thereby discouraging nuisance 
suits. If the defendants object to making payments out of their own pockets because they believe 
the suit is groundless, and if the corporation cannot directly indemnify them for amounts paid in 
settlement of the suit, the corporation might make a disguised indemnification through various 
forms of compensation to the defendants. 
As to directors' and officers' liability insurance, the insurer would have no incentive to pay a 
settlement out of its own pocket if, after litigating to a successful judgment, it could avoid payment 
because the corporation would either indemnify the defendant or reimburse the insurer for paying 
the defendant's costs. The policy, however, may not provide for subrogation of the insurer to the 
defendant's right of indemnification and, in any case, indemnification might be discretionary. 
Therefore, the insurer might be more willing to pay a small settlement than the larger costs of a 
successful, litigated defense. 
Thus, both indemnification and liability insurance may make it possible for a plaintiff to 
profit from a strike suit. 
. 
218 The secret settlement could entail not only cash payments but also promises to retain plain-
llfl's attorney for future services. Even if such retention became known, it might be hard to con-
ne~t it to a secret settlement. Further, rules requiring court approval of settlements of derivative 
su~ts do not apply to suits threatened but not filed, Bishop, supra note 37, at 1081 n.ll, so that one 
might profit by threatening without filing a nuisance suit. 
219 For example, indemnification by either the corporation or an insurer might be barred in 
cases of settlement" or conditioned on court approval. 
220 Only a few jurisdictions currently provide for such reimbursement. See H. HENN, supra 
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attorneys who bring frivolous derivative suits, and by disciplinary ac-
tions against such attorneys.z21 
Even if strike suits were completely eliminated, the corporation 
might still become embroiled in an expensive derivative. suit that will 
yield no recovery for the corporation. Parties to all litigation face this 
danger, however, and the danger does not seem any greater in the field 
of derivative suits. As Professor Lattin has stated, "The cleansing effect 
of the threat of such suits would seem to an impartial observer to far 
outweigh the possible abuse through strike suits."222 Permitting a di-
rector's colleagues on the board to stop a derivative suit against him 
would vitiate much of this "cleansing effect" and the other benefits of 
derivative suits. 
The Mantifactured Pleadings Problem 
The proposed approach could give a derivative plaintiff a strong 
incentive to name a majority of the directors as defendants, thereby 
both obviating a demand on the board and disabling the board from 
thwarting the suit. This sticky problem usually arises when the plaintiff 
alleges that certain persons have profited unfairly at the corporation's 
expense and that most of the directors, though not profiting themselves, 
have conspired in, approved, or knowingly or negligently acquiesced in 
the alleged transactions. On one hand, such allegations, if true, would 
not only make a demand futile and the board's opposition ineffective to 
stop a derivative suit, but would also render the majority liable for 
breach of the directors' duties of care and loyalty.223 On the other 
hand, to permit the plaintiff to circumvent a demand on the board and 
the effects of the board's refusal to sue simply by adding a few names to 
his complaint could deprive the board of any power to control corpo-
rate litigation. Furthermore, even though in theory directors may be 
liable for approving or acquiescing in transactions in which they have 
not profited, cases in which directors have been held so liable actually 
constitute "a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."224 
Courts have feared, probably too much, that imposition ofliability for 
"mere" negligence on directors, who usually receive small compensa-
tion and serve only part time, would deter the most qualified persons 
from becoming directors. 225 
note I, § 378, at 799 n.2. See also FED. R. C1v. P. II (if attorney signs pleadings without "knowl-
edge, information, and belief [that] there is good ground to support it [he] may be subjected to 
appropriate disciplinary action"). 
221 See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 68 (1968). .. 
222 N. LATTIN, supra note 3, § 115, at 457. See also text accompanying notes 241-44 infra. 
223 See generally H. HENN, supra note I,§§ 218, 234-235; N. LATTIN, supra note 3, §§ 78-79. 
224 See note 37 supra. 
225 Thus, some courts have held that directors are liable only for gross negligence, but this test 
has been criticized. See note 26 supra. 
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Given these conflicting considerations, it is not surprising that the 
courts have dealt with the problem in widely divergent ways. One line 
of cases holds that allegations of board approval or acquiescence in the 
alleged wrongs or of domination of the board by the alleged wrongdo-
ers must be supported by particular facts and that domination by the 
largest (albeit minority) shareholder will not be assumed.226 Another 
line of cases holds less specific allegations sufficient, or at least is more 
willing to assume domination of the board by a large shareholder.227 
A few steps can be taken to deal with the problem without dis-
missing the complaint. In some cases the naming of certain directors 
may be so patently frivolous that a court might dismiss the complaint 
as to them. For example, dismissal might be appropriate as to defend-
ants who were not directors at the time of the alleged wrongs.228 On 
occasion it may be appropriate to approve discovery and a trial limited 
to the issue of domination of the board, or its knowledge or approval of 
or acquiescence in the alleged wrong. 229 Separate claims of wrongdo-
226 The case most often cited is In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), 
cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), a suit charging antitrust and Investment Company Act violations 
by the investment advisors and minority, affiliated directors of four mutual funds. The court held 
that allegations of domination and control of the unaffiliated directors without supporting facts 
were not sufficiently particular to meet the requirements of FED. R. C1v. P. 23.1 for excuse of a 
demand on the directors. In dictum the court said that even allegations of participation by the 
majority in wrongful acts are insufficient to excuse a demand unless they include allegations of 
"self-interest or other indication of bias." 479 F.2d at 265. See also Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. 
Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (allegation of ownership of 27% of corporate stock and 
possession of two nominees on board insufficient to plead domination of board); Heit v. Baird, 567 
F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977); Meyers v. K~eler, 414 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Phillips v. Brad-
ford, 62 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (demand held not excused where unaffiliated directors 
named as defendants without allegations of domination); CHICAGO Comment; supra note 3, at 
17f:-78. 
27 Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964) 
(allegations that majority "participated in or negligently tolerated" wrongs by two directors who 
owned 39% of stock held sufficient); Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(distinguishing In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions on grounds of amendment of the Investment 
Company Act); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed per curiam, 503 
F.2d554 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 
N.E.2d 180, 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 506 (1975) (allegations held sufficient despite no allegation of 
personal benefit by board majority). See Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(allegations that directors "participated, approved of and acquiesced in" wrongs held sufficient). 
q. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. 
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (allegations that directors aided and abetted the wrongdoing and 
evidence that they would refuse to sue held sufficient); Brick v. Dominion Mort. & Realty Trust, 
442 F. Supp. 283 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (allegations that all directors were participants in fraudulent 
scheme was sufficiently pleaded); Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972) (complaint naming all directors as conspirators or aiders and abettors held sufficiently 
particular). See also note 39 supra. 
228 See In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
857 (1973). Cf. Galefv. Alexander, No. 79-7166, slip op. at 5925-26 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (stating 
that state and federal claims may be handled separately for dismissal purposes). 
229 See note 183 and accompanying text supra. 
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ing can be treated separately. Thus, if a few directors are charged With 
looting the corporation and the majority are charged with acquiescin 
in the looting, the former charge can be handled as a separate charg g 
not implicating a majority of the directors. e 
Courts may be justly reluctant to allow bare allegations to circum-
vent the requirement of a demand on the board because compliance 
with the requirement is so easy,230 but the effect of a refusal to sue 
raises more serious problems. Although accepting at face value the 
plaintiff's allegations of domination of or collusion, approval, or acqui-
escence by the board may lead to abuses, this seems preferable to dis-
missing what may be meritorious claims, thereby negating important 
shareholder rights, without full discovery and trial. Perhaps more im-
portant, given the numerous options open to the corporation to defend 
itself against frivolous derivative suits and the strong incentive for 
plaintiffs not to bring such suits, 231 the prospect that the corporation 
may occasionally become involved in a suit that proves frivolous 
should not warrant flinging another major obstacle in the path of deriv-
ative plaintiffs . 
.Disregard of the Corporation~ .Best Interests 
Even a meritorious suit may be detrimental to the corporation. In 
the decided cases, special litigation committees have often pointed to 
the costs of litigation, the interruption of corporate business, and the 
undermining of personnel morale as reasons for not bringing suit.m 
To some extent these reasons could justify opposing a derivative suit.m 
Although certain steps by the corporation, such as demanding security 
for expenses or seeking a protective order from the court, can some-
times diminish these problems,234 they cannot always be eliminated. 
Moreover, although the shareholder-plaintiff may have little incentive 
to bring a groundless derivative suit,235 he may well have an incentive 
to bring a meritorious suit even though it will be detrimental to the 
230 See CHICAGO Comment, supra note 3, at 172-73." 
231 See notes I 96-202 and accompanying text supra. See also FED. R. C1v. P. I I (providing for 
discipline of attorneys who falsely sign pleadings). 
232 See Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip op. at 19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (committee 
concerned about costs of litigation and indemnification); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 
514 n.I3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 
1980) (committee found "little likelihood of a recovery sufficient to justify the cost of maintaining 
an action"). See also note 164 supra. q. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 178, 240 P.2d 
421, 428 (1952) (board may consider "cost in money, time and disruption" in deciding whether to 
sue). 
233 See notes 162 & 164 and accompanying text supra. See also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-
3180, slip op. at 21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (directors may decide to terminate even meritorious 
suits). 
234 See text accompanying notes 179 & 197-200 supra. 
235 See text accompanying notes 209-14 supra. 
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corporation, since a court may not consider the costs and other detri-
ments of the suit to the corporation in fixing plaintiff's attorneys' 
fees.236 If the suit fails, the corporation not only incurs its own costs, 
but also may have to reimburse the individual defendants for their 
costs.237 
The proposed approach would allow the court to weigh the costs 
of the suit to the corporation where a minority of the directors is 
sued,238 but not where a majority is sued. It ·can be argued that the 
theoretically disinterested directors should be able to halt a derivative 
suit even if brought against a majority if they believe it will harm the 
corporation. Although this argument has considerable validity and is 
the strongest argument against the proposed approach, it is not ulti-
mately compelling. First, derivative suits often do produce substantial 
monetary rt;coveries for the corporation.239 Second, the cost of deriva-
tive litigation is rarely large in relation to the size of the corporation. 
Moreover, a substantial part of the cost of derivative litigation results 
from defendants' efforts to block plaintiff's attempt to reach a hearing 
on the merits. The high cost of shareholder suits would be better at-
tacked by legislative or judicial reform sweeping away many of these 
obstacles (as well as dealing with excessive discovery by plaintiffs), 
rather than by permitting directors of dubious independence to termi-
nate such suits. 
Z36 The author is not aware of any case where a court has explicitly taken such costs and 
detriments into account. There are, however, several cases where courts have denied plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees altogether because the plaintiff, though partly successful, conferred little benefit on 
the corporation. In reSt. Clair Estate Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 964, 153 P.2d 453 (1944); Bachelder v. 
Brentwood Lanes, Inc., 369 Mich. 155, 119 N.W.2d 630 (1963). That the costs of these suits to the 
corporation exceeded the benefits received may have been an unspoken reason for complete de-
nial of attorneys' fees. Furthermore, in considering whether to approve proposed settlements, 
courts have often weighed the costs to the corporation of continued litigation, including adverse 
effects on the company's public relations and employee morale. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 
390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 196 F.2d 484, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1952); 
Roman v. Master Indus., Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 91,806 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Berger v. Dyson, Ill F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D.R.l. 1953); Hoffman v. Dann, 42 
Del. Ch. 123, 139-40, 205 A.2d 343, 352-53 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); 
Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 767, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1967); 
~ann v. Luke, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725, 731-32 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Indeed, the corporation may settle the 
dispute with the true defendants, see note 198 supra, and the court will consider the detriment of 
continued litigation to the corporation's public relations and employee morale in deciding 
whether to approve the settlement. See, e.g., Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat') Bank, 141 F.2d 285, 288 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944). 237 See note 75 supra. In many cases, especially where a defendant has settled or been only 
pa~ially successful at trial, a corporation may indemnify the defendant but is not statutorily re-
quired to do so. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) & (b) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 
§ 724(b) (McKinney 1963). It is questionable whether such a voluntarily incurred cost should be a 
c~~se for the corporation to complain. 
8 See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra. 239 s, H . 
ee ornstem, supra note 6, at 15-19; Hornstein, supra note 16, at 814. 
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On another level, many of the benefits and detriments of deriva-
tive suits are nonmonetary or nonquantifiable. On the detriment side 
the costs of interruption of business and undermining of personnel mo~ 
rale are difficult to estimate. It might be argued that the undermining 
of personnel morale merits consideration apart from its financial im-
pact on the corporation. Morale problems, however, will primarily af-
fect those accused of misconduct. For them, the effect is perhaps 
unfortunate but necessary if they are guilty; if they are not guilty, suc-
cessful defense of the suit and reimbursement of litigation costs from 
the corporation should be sufficient vindication. 
On the benefit side, the monetary value to the corporation of in-
junctions procured on its behalf is also hard to estimate. More impor-
tant is the deterrent value of shareholder suits. The broader 
implications of the deterrent effect of derivative suits are discussed be-
low, but even considering only the single corporation in question, the 
deterrent value of derivative suits-though impossible to estimate-is 
undoubtedly very great. 240 
In sum, the quantifiable monetary costs to the corporation of a 
particular suit are unlikely to harm the corporation substantially, and 
in general these costs probably do not greatly exceed the quantifiable 
monetary benefits of derivative suits. Moreover, the total benefits of 
derivative suits far outweigh their detriments. Accordingly, the direc-
tors' decision that a derivative suit against their colleagues should be 
halted because its potential costs outweigh its potential benefits should r· 
only be considered as one relevant factor when a minority of directors 
is sued and should be disregarded when a majority is sued. 
DETERRING CORPORATE ABUSES AND LEGITIMIZING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In addition to the immediate, perceptible benefits a corporation 
realizes from a successful derivative suit, derivative suits serve the addi-
tional, and perhaps more important, function of deterring corporate 
abuses and legitimizing the corporate governance system. The deter-
rent effect of derivative suits, though not quantifiable, has been recog-
nized by courts and commentators.241 If directors and officers know 
that any charge of wrongdoing on their part will be weighed by their 
colleagues on the board and not by a court with the assistance of an 
aggressive attorney for plaintiffs, the temptation of directors and of-
ficers to line their pockets at the expense of the shareholders will be 
greatly increased, and some will succumb to the temptation. 
240 See note 241 and accompanying text i'!fra. 
241 See Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); N. LATTIN, supra note 3, f. 
§ 115, at 457; Bishop, supra note 37, at 1087 ("[T]he principal legal d~terrent to the common 
varieties of self-dealing is probably fear of civil liability."); Hornstein, supra note 6, at 31. 
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If corporate abuses increase, shareholders will not be the only 
- losers. There has been growing criticism of, and even cynicism toward, 
the corporate governance system,242 and any judicially created rule that 
encourages corporate abuses by limiting derivative suits will breed 
more of the same.243 A review of the various proposals to improve cor-
porate governance is beyond the scope of this article. It suffices to say 
that broad availability of derivative suits to disgruntled minority share-
holders not only is consistent with these proposals but, as compared 
with them, has the advantage of requiring minimal governmental inter-
ference with corporate management and no additional legislation. 
It is not surprising that corporate officers and directors should op-
pose derivative suits, but their opposition is shortsighted. If courts al-
low corporate miscreants to go free at the behest of the miscreants' 
fellow directors, public resentment will force changes in corporate gov-
ernance laws-<:hanges that corporations almost certainly will find 
more onerous than derivative suits.244 
CONCLUSION 
Recent decisions granting the board of directors broad powers to 
terminate derivative suits have created a grave danger that serious 
wrongs by corporate insiders may go unchallenged. The proposals set 
forth in this article would drastically reduce that danger without ren-
dering the corporation defenseless against frivolous or unduly costly 
derivative suits. The question remains who will see that these propos-
als, or something like them, are put into effect. 
The state legislatures are unlikely to do so. Most state legislation 
during the last forty years has been designed to limit derivative suits, 
not encourage them.245 Congress cannot act directly to amend laws 
relating to state-created derivative actions and is unlikely to authorize 
federal derivative actions dealing with abuses by corporate insiders 
generally, although it might deal with the problem by requiring federal 
chartering or minimum standards for state chartering.246 Also, Burks v. 
Lasker247 makes it likely that the federal courts will follow state law as 
242 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 83, at 1104 & ll08 n.l9 (the latter containing a brief list of 
proposals for reform). 243 See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 
1831 (1979) ("[I]t cannot be expected that the public or the Fund's stockholders would believe that 
· · · statutorily disinterested directors could act with that impartiality and objectivity which the 
public interest requires."). · 
244 For example, Senator Metzenbaum is planning to introduce a bill to establish minimum 
federal standards for state chartering of certain corporations. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 
(Dec. 12, 1979). 245 
2 See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra. 46 " 
2 
<>ee note 244 supra. 
47 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979). 
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to whether the board may terminate derivative suits. 248 Therefore, re-
lief must come from the state courts. Although the judicial record to 
date is not encouraging, a change of direction is quite possible. 
First, the precedents will not bind too tightly a court that wants to 
impose meaningful limits on board termination of derivative suits. 
Most of the special litigation committee cases arose either in New york 
courts or in federal courts that tried to apply state law that was, except 
as to New York, almost nonexistent.249 Even in New York, the special 
facts of Auerbach v. Bennett250 make it easy to distinguish.251 Most 
other refusal-to-sue cases have also been decided by federal courts. 
Thus, there is firm authority for board termination of derivative suits in 
only a few states. Second, since most of the cases purport to apply the 
business judgment rule, a court could go far toward adopting the pro-
posals contained herein by taking the reasonable view that the business 
judgment rule requires clear proof both of the directors' independence 
and of their reasonably prudent investigation of the facts. 252 Finally, 
the recent Delaware cases on "going private" transactions253 show that 
state courts can act quickly to enforce fiduciary duties when they 
choose to do so, even though precedents suggest that they might not act 
at all.254 
In sum, the path is still open for state courts to remedy the dangers 
created by board termination of derivative suits, thereby preserving the 
derivative suit as an important tool to maintain the integrity of corpo-
rate officers and directors. To reject this path and to follow instead the 
path suggested by the cases to date will certainly mean the virtual death 
of the derivative suit. 
248 See notes 43-50 and accompanying text supra. 
249 See generally text accompanying notes 51-69 supra. 
250 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
251 See note 64 supra. 
252 See note 26 supra. 
253 See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Sup. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. 
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Sup. 1977); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
254 Indeed, the Delaware courts may already have begun to act. In Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 
4800 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1980), decided while this article was going to press, the court held that the 
business judgment rule is irrelevant to an attempt by a supposedly independent board committee 
to terminate a derivative suit charging breach of fiduciary duty. The court therefore denied de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment. This decision, together with Galefv. Alexander, No. 79-
7166 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1980) (holding that the board may not terminate a derivative suit naming all 
the directors as defendants), may presage a split among the courts, prompting a thorough recon-
sideration of the path the courts have been taking. 
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